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Around the world, the focus of copyright policy reform debates is
shifting from the protection of copyright owners’ rights towards
defining their appropriate limits. There is, however, a great deal of
confusion about the legal ontology of copyright “limits,”
“exceptions,” “exemptions,” “defenses,” and “user rights.” While the
choice of terminology may seem to be a matter of mere semantics,
how we describe and conceptualize lawful uses within our copyright
system has a direct bearing on how we delimit and define the scope
of the owner’s control. Taking seriously the role of rhetoric in
shaping law and policy, this Paper critically examines the recent
embrace of the language of “users’ rights” to frame fair use, fair
dealing, and other non-infringing acts. This terminology has been
adopted to varying degrees by courts in Canada, Israel, and the
United States and is increasingly employed by public interest
advocates and policy-makers at the domestic and international level.
In this Paper, I ask whether the rise of “user rights,” thus cast, is a
positive development that will help to rein in some of copyright’s
excesses, advancing the cause of content users and the public at
large—or whether it is, perhaps, something of a false friend.
Drawing on lessons from critical legal theory, I caution that “rights”
may be a double-edged sword with the potential to undermine or
obstruct the public interests, social values, and relationships that
should inform copyright’s development in the digital age. As a
rhetorical tool, “user rights” should therefore be wielded carefully if
public interest advocates are to avoid self-inflicted injury.

I. INTRODUCTION
Until recently, the international copyright system had been
directed, almost exclusively, at ensuring a baseline level of
protection across the globe for the rights of authors and copyright

2017]

GLOBALIZING USER RIGHTS-TALK

3

owners.1 The predictable result of this policy preoccupation has been
the continuous strengthening or “ratcheting up” of owners’ rights.2
The coming into force, in 2016, of the Marrakesh Treaty,3 which
requires Contracting Parties to enact specific exceptions to copyright,
was therefore hailed as a “transformational moment in international
copyright law.”4 The focus appears to be shifting from the rights of
copyright owners to the rights of users of copyright-protected works.
The Development Agenda, adopted in 2007 by the World Intellectual
Property Organization, provided a mandate and impetus for this
international policy shift, emphasizing the importance of flexibilities,
exceptions, and limitations in intellectual property norm-setting and

1. See World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20,
1996, 36 I.L.M. 65 [hereinafter WIPO Copyright Treaty]; World Intellectual
Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36
I.L.M. 76 [hereinafter WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty]; Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]; Berne Convention for the Protection
of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne
Convention].
2. Susan Sell, The Global IP Upward Ratchet, Anti-Counterfeiting and Piracy
Enforcement Efforts: The State of Play, PIJIP RESEARCH PAPER SERIES 1, 1-4 (Oct.
1, 2010) (detailing how intellectual property maximalists have sought to increase
intellectual property protection and enforcement after the 1994 WTO TRIPS
negotiations); see also PETER DRAHOS, THE GLOBAL RATCHET FOR INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS: WHY IT FAILS AS POLICY AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT
IT 1-5 (2003), https://www.anu.edu.au/fellows/pdrahos/reports /pdfs/2003
globalipratchet.pdf (explaining that the main global intellectual property
frameworks’ key is “giving to subsequent users of technology a set of core ‘use’
rights”); PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO
OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? (2002); SUSAN SELL, PRIVATE LAW, PUBLIC
POWER: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003); see
generally James Boyle, A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of Intellectual
Property, 2004 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1 (2004) (explaining errors arising from the
owner-centric nature of the international IP regime); Pamela Samuelson, The US
Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 Va. J. Int’l L. 369 (1997) (detailing U.S. positions
opposed to owner-centric intellectual property law); Alan Story, Burn Berne: Why
the Leading International Copyright Convention Must be Repealed, 40 HOUS. L.
REV. 763 (2003) (describing fundamental problems with the Berne Convention).
3. The Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons
Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled, June 28, 2013, 52
I.L.M. 1309 [hereinafter Marrakesh VIP Treaty].
4. Margaret Ann Wilkinson, International Copyright: Marrakesh and the
Future of Users’ Rights Exceptions, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 107, 107-27 (Mark Perry ed., 2016).
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recognizing the benefits of a rich and accessible public domain.5
Meanwhile, the realpolitik of the international economic order
cautions against unbridled optimism in this regard.6 The “multimillion dollar circus needed to produce the [Marrakesh] Treaty,” as
well as the still sputtering negotiations over a Draft Treaty on
Copyright Limitations and Exceptions for Libraries and Archives,
speaks to both the urgency and the obstacles at play in the tentative
turn to user rights.7 Provoked in part by a period of rapid
technological development, there can be little doubt that copyright
limitations and exceptions are emerging as one of the most critical
and controversial areas of copyright reform, both nationally and
internationally.8 As Paul Goldstein predicts: “No corner of copyright
law promises to be more vexed—or consequential—over the next
quarter-century than exceptions and limitations.”9
It is unfortunate, then, that there exists a great deal of confusion
about how to understand and position copyright “limits,”
“exceptions,” “exemptions,” and “defenses” within the overall
copyright scheme. This is not simply a matter of semantics; it has
more to do with legal ontology than mere terminology, in the sense
that the very nature of the “thing” is at issue. Moreover, how we
conceptualize the “privileges,” “liberties,” or “rights” of users to
engage with copyright-protected works has a direct bearing on how
we define the scope of those lawful uses and their availability to
members of the public: an “exception” to an established right may be
5. World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], The 45 Adopted
Recommendations Under the WIPO Development Agenda, ¶¶ 16, 22 (2007)
[hereinafter WIPO Development Agenda].
6. See Jerome H. Reichman, The Limits of “Limitations and Exceptions” in
Copyright Law, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS
292, 302 (Ruth L. Okediji ed., 2017).
7. Id. at 302.
8. See RUTH L. OKEDIJI, Reframing International Copyright Limitations and
Exceptions as Development Policy, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS
AND EXCEPTIONS 429, 432 (2017) (questioning whether current intellectual
property law’s understanding of limitations and exceptions actually helps
developing-states).
9. Paul Goldstein, Reviews and Endorsements, (reviewing COPYRIGHT LAW IN
AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS) (last visited July 8, 2017),
http://www.cambridge.org/ca/academic/subjects/law/intellectualproperty/copyright-law-age-limitations-and-exceptions?format=HB&isbn=
9781107132375#theogtb8WzHQLJ7r.97.
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narrowly drawn as a matter of principle; the burden of making out a
“defense” may be placed squarely on the shoulders of the defendant;
the “privilege” to use may be subject to specific and onerous
conditions; the “right” to use may be enforced against others who
would encroach upon it, including the rights-bearing copyright
owner. But more than this, the legal language we choose comes
loaded with its own rhetorical force and, in our public discourse and
legal imagination, few if any words can hold more power than the
claim to “right.”
Perhaps for this reason, it has become increasingly common for
public interest and public domain advocates in the intellectual
property arena to articulate the need for copyright limitations and
exceptions in terms that evoke the user’s “right” to use a protected
work or elements of it.10 To date, the language of “users’ rights” has
found its greatest formal endorsement in Canada, where the Supreme
Court has repeatedly affirmed that fair dealing and other copyright
exceptions are “users’ rights” and must be interpreted as such.11
Amongst those of us who have advocated in favor of greater freedom
for fair and lawful uses of copyright-protected works, the Supreme
Court of Canada’s decision to bequeath upon a rarely accepted
defense the label of “right” was hailed as a great victory for users
and the public.12 It seemed to represent a hard-fought win against the
10. See, e.g., Global Network on Copyright User Rights, INFO JUSTICE,
http://infojustice.org/flexible-use (last visited July 8, 2017) (describing the Global
Network on Copyright User Rights, a group coordinated by the American
University Washington College of Law Program on Information Justice and
Intellectual Property, focusing on “the publications of research and provision of
technical assistance to explain how adopting more open, flexible and general user
rights . . . can promote social and economic interests”).
11. See, e.g., Alberta v. Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency, [2012] 2
S.C.R. 345 (Can.); Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Can. v.
Bell Can., [2012] 2 S.C.R. 326 (Can.); CCH Canadian v. Law Soc’y of Upper
Can., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339 (Can.).
12. See, e.g., Carys Craig, The Changing Face of Fair Dealing in Canadian
Copyright Law: A Proposal for Legislative Reform, in IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST:
THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW, 437, 452 (Michael Geist ed., 2005)
(attributing the Canadian Supreme Court’s restrictive interpretation of fair dealing
to the identification of a sole intended beneficiary); Abraham Drassinower, Taking
User Rights Seriously, in IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN
COPYRIGHT LAW, 462, 477 (Geist ed., 2005) (noting the necessity of rejecting a
sweat-of-the-brow originality standard for a skill and judgment standard when
reforming Canadian copyright law); Graham Reynolds, Towards a Right to
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overwhelming forces that had advanced the cause of copyright
owners and corporate interests in the battle over the new
technological terrain (albeit in a case involving the distinctly
twentieth-century technology of photocopiers and fax machines).13
The judicial acknowledgment that unauthorized users of works had
“rights” to assert in the face of infringement claims was quite simply
a game-changer for Canadian copyright law.14 Prior to this, Canada’s
courts had acknowledged the “rights” only of plaintiff copyright
owners, against which the mere “interests” of defendants—and the
public at large—had typically paled. Fair dealing had
correspondingly been relegated to a marginal exception, available in
theory but never in practice affording a defense to a prima facie
infringement.15 The recognition of user rights thus dramatically
corrected Canada’s traditionally owner-centric regime as it was
adjusted to the new digital century. It seemed to retrieve the
individual user from the rhetoric of authorship rewards and economic
incentives that had, for so long, threatened to obscure her.
At this moment in time, it is fair to say that “virtually every other
country in the world has less clearly enshrined users’ rights than has
Canadian law: no one else’s courts (or legislators) explicitly express
the exceptions to the rights of rights-holders to be users’ rights.”16
Commentators in jurisdictions where exceptions to copyright
Engage in the Fair Transformative Use of Copyright-Protected Expression, in
FROM RADICAL EXTREMISM TO BALANCED COPYRIGHT: CANADIAN COPYRIGHT
AND THE DIGITAL AGENDA 395, 397 (Michael Geist ed., 2010); Myra J. Tawfik,
The Supreme Court of Canada and the “Fair Dealing Trilogy:” Elaborating a
Doctrine of User Rights Under Canadian Copyright Law, 51 ALTA. L. REV. 191,
191-92 (2013); David Vaver, Copyright Defenses as User Rights, 60 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y U.S.A. 661, 667-68 (2013) (describing the impact of the seminal case CCH
Canadian on balancing user’s rights). But see Pascale Chapdelaine, The
Ambiguous Nature of Copyright Users’ Rights, 26 INTELL. PROP. J. 1, 5 (2013)
(cautioning against the damaging effects of the uncertain nature of users’ rights on
the coherence and legitimacy of copyright law).
13. Vaver, supra note 12, at 667.
14. Id.
15. See Craig, supra note 12, at 452; Carys J. Craig, Digital Locks and the Fate
of Fair Dealing in Canada: In Pursuit of ‘Prescriptive Parallelism’, 13 J. WORLD
INTELL. PROP. 503 (2010).
16. Margaret Ann Wilkinson, Copyright Users’ Rights in International Law, 60
L. PUBLICATIONS 9, 10 (2014), http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/lawpub/84.
But see infra Section II.D. (discussing the growing status of user rights in
comparative and international contexts).
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infringement remain narrow and comparably ineffectual might
reasonably look upon the Canadian example with something like
envy.17 Even those who hail from jurisdictions where fair use is
flexible and capable of expansive application in service of social
goals18 find good cause to wish for a similar judicial utterance.19
Advocates interested in globalizing fair use and safeguarding
copyright limitations and exceptions at the international level may
also see the potential of asserting “user rights” to advance their cause
in the global arena.20 But before we rush to conclude that the idea of
“users’ rights” is a shining beacon, guiding copyright inexorably
towards its public policy goals, we should ask: Are there any risks,
any potential downsides, associated with this rhetoric of “user
rights,” even (or especially) for those who hold most dear the very
interests newly cloaked in “rights?” Is this purely a triumph for the
public interest; galvanizing users, validating their demands, and
constraining copyright’s corrosive expansion? Or, is there a price to
pay for repackaging the public interest in the rhetorical wrapping of
“user rights?”
In seeking to answer this question, I begin by describing, in Part
17. See, e.g., Alexandra Sims, The Case for Fair Use in New Zealand, 24 INT’L
J.L. INFO. TECH. 176, 176-202 (2016); Hoachen Sun, Fair Use as a Collective User
Right, 90 N.C. L. REV. 125, 178-87 (2011) (“By giving judicial recognition to the
idea of fair dealing as a user’s right, rather than a defense, the Supreme Court of
Canada expressly embraced a broad-based approach to interpreting the scope of the
fair dealing doctrine in order to protect the public interest.”).
18. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (creating an open, flexible, and general
fair use defense); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579-80
(1994) (referring to the “fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space within the
confines of copyright . . . [flowing from] the need simultaneously to protect
copyrighted material and to allow others to build upon it”).
19. See Niva Elkin-Koren, The New Frontiers of User Rights, 32 AM. U. INT’L
L. REV. 1, 42 (2016) (arguing that a user rights approach to fair use may offer a
more robust safeguarding of users’ liberties in the digital ecosystem); Lior Zemer,
Authors and Users: Lessons from Outre-Mer, 25 INTELL. PROP. J. 231, 263-67
(2013).
20. See, e.g., Wilkinson, Copyright Users’ Rights, supra note 16, at 12
(arguing that the protections for libraries and archives can best be advanced by
enshrining user rights in an international copyright instrument); Thomas Riis &
Jens Hemmingsen Schovsbo, Users’ Rights: Reconstructing Copyright Policy on
Utilitarian Grounds, 29 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1 (2007) (proposing the
enactment of concrete rules recognizing users’ rights at the national and
international level in order to counter-balance the proprietary logic of the current
copyright system).
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II, the traditional role of rights-based reasoning in our copyright
system as a justification for the broad protection of authors and
owners. I point to the ways in which the rhetoric of rights has
typically been wielded to achieve outcomes that fail to serve the
purposes of the copyright system by privileging private entitlement
over the public interest. I then chart the rise of countervailing “users’
rights” in Canada, in particular, and the role that they have played in
ostensibly recalibrating the so-called copyright balance. The
discussion then turns to the status of user rights in comparative and
international contexts, and their growing prevalence in copyright
policy and law-making globally. Part III warns of some of the ways
in which the idea of “users’ rights” might, somewhat counterintuitively, obstruct efforts to advance the interests of users and the
public in and through the copyright system. Part IV looks beyond the
copyright context, asking the more general question: “[W]hat is
wrong with rights?”21 Briefly sketching out some of the core “rights
critiques” offered by critical legal scholars over the past few decades,
I present some reasons for skepticism about the capacity of rights to
remedy inequalities and rectify power imbalances. Turning to
Feminist and Critical Race Theory, however, I consider whether
there may, nonetheless, be good reasons to embrace rights-talk, if not
as an ideological commitment, then as a strategic tool. In Part V, I
conclude with some thoughts about how these lessons from the
landscape of legal theory might helpfully extend into the realm of
copyright law—informing efforts to expand copyright limitations
and exceptions in pursuit of globalized fair use.
Ultimately, I argue that the language of “user rights” has an
important role to play in advancing the public interest—albeit
primarily a pragmatic one. There is a risk, however, to embracing
“user rights” without problematizing the traditional conception of
“right” and refining our rhetoric. The inherently individualizing and
obfuscatory nature of right-based reasoning—whether employed in
respect of authors, owners or users—has the potential to obscure the
public interests, social values, and relationships that should inform
copyright’s development in the digital age. At the same time, the
escalation of rights rhetoric in the copyright debate threatens to
21. See infra Part IV (outlining objections raised by the school of Critical Legal
Studies).
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compound rather than to contest the moral or proprietary claims to
right made of behalf of copyright owners. The concept of “user
rights,” then, is potentially a double-edged sword that should be
wielded carefully if public interest advocates are to avoid a selfinflicted injury.

II. RIGHTS RHETORIC IN COPYRIGHT
DISCOURSE
A. THE RISE OF AUTHORS’ “RIGHTS”
The language of rights has long played an important role in our
copyright system. As many leading copyright scholars have
demonstrated, the idea of the author’s right to own that which he
creates through his intellectual effort permeates the foundations of
copyright law.22 While it was not always thus,23 the inception of the
modern common law copyright regime with the enactment of the
Statute of Anne,24 and the subsequent “battle of the booksellers” that
played out in the courts, solidified the notion of the author as rightbearer, and copyright as his natural entitlement.25 Though arguably
22. See Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving to Own Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.KENT. L. REV. 609, 610-11 (1993) (describing Hegel’s interpretation of property);
PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1, 120 (1996); Frank
H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 108, 110 (1990); Richard Epstein, Liberty Versus Property - Cracks in the
Foundation of Copyright Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2005); Wendy J.
Gordon, A Property RIGHT in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the
Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1593 (1993)
(highlighting the permeation of language relating to copyright in Lockean theory);
Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 287
(1988) (noting that, throughout history, Americans have been obsessed with the
idea of property, starting with the Pilgrims); Tom Palmer, Are Patents and
Copyrights Morally Justified?: The Philosophy of Property Rights and Ideal
Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817, 820 (1990) (detailing the Utilitarian
theory of property).
23. See MARILYN RANDALL, PRAGMATIC PLAGIARISM: AUTHORSHIP, PROFIT,
AND POWER 67-68 (2001) (explaining that the idea of plagiarism is a relatively new
concept, as ancient tradition regarded it as the passing down of stories and ideas).
24. Copyright Act 1710, 8 Ann. c. 19 (Eng.).
25. See, e.g., LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 11 (1968)(explaining that “the problem of authors’ rights did not
become a significant issue until the eighteenth century, and then only because the
booksellers made it so in an effort to perpetuate their monopoly after the Statute of
Anne.”); also Millar v. Taylor, [1769] 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (KB)(finding that a
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conceived as a pragmatic means to disrupt the London booksellers’
monopoly under the Stationers’ Charter, and justified as a route by
which to encourage public learning, the Statute of Anne placed the
exclusive right to copy in the hands of the author.26 Upon expiration
of the temporary monopoly established under the statute, a series of
cases brought by publishers before the courts sought to establish the
author’s natural (though assignable) right to own his work—the
fruits of his labor—as property.27 The argument was ultimately
rejected by a majority of the House of Lords, but the rhetoric of
rights stuck fast within the public consciousness and the legal
imagination.28 Converging with the philosophical rise of
enlightenment values of possessive individualism, and the practical
growth of a literate public and a market economy, the idea of the
author’s right to own his work took root and flourished inside the
greenhouse glass of copyright law.29
Over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the
rights of the author-owner rose to dominate the jurisprudence of the
British courts (and, by extension, those of colonial Canada), and to
shape the legal doctrine that defined the subject and scope of
copyright.30 In the common law world, at least, the continued
commitment to this notion of the author’s right found its rationale in
the Lockean labor-acquisition theory.31 Regarded through this
theoretical lens, the author is the worthy intellectual laborer,
deserving to reap what he has sown, while the user is the thief or
common law interest in the work vested in the author as a matter of natural
justice); Donaldson v. Beckett, [1774] 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (HL) (ruling that authors
had no common law interest in their works post publication).
26. See Patterson, supra note 25, at 14 (describing the Statute of Anne as a
“trade regulation device” that was misconstrued as providing for an author’s right).
27. RONAN DEAZELEY, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT TO COPY: CHARTING THE
MOVEMENT OF COPYRIGHT LAW IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN (1696-1775)
31-50 (2004).
28. See Patterson, supra note 25, at 15 (arguing that it was in fact the overruled
Millar v. Taylor decision, supra note 26, that had the greatest effect upon copyright
doctrine, “firmly fix[ing] the idea of copyright as an author’s right.”
29. See MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT
(1993); Mark Rose, The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson v Becket and the
Genealogy of Modern Authorship, 23 REPRESENTATIONS 51 (1988).
30. Patterson, supra note 25, at 4-7.
31. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 10-19 (1690)
(establishing the labor-acquisition theory).
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trespasser who seeks to benefit from the author’s pains.32 Such a
rights-based account of copyright had the effect of expanding the
scope of protection available to “authors,” lowering the threshold for
protection in order to ensure that labor, effort, and expense did not go
unrewarded.33 Thus, the protection of transcribed speeches,
laboriously compiled telephone directories, betting coupons, and tax
forms was justified as necessary for preventing the misappropriation
of labor.34 Over the same period, a similar logic guaranteed the
continued expansion of protectable subject matter (from books to
maps and charts to artistic, musical, and dramatic works) as well as
the expanded duration of authors’ rights (from fourteen years plus a
further fourteen upon renewal to the life of the author plus fifty years
beyond his death).35
From early in the life of the modern copyright system, the rightsbased reasoning of the courts shifted copyright away from the social
goals that it was conceived to serve,36 and caused it to become,
instead, a body of law focused overwhelmingly on the protection of
the (intellectual) property and private interests of owners. It is to this
end that rights rhetoric has traditionally been deployed in the
copyright context—that is, to the benefit of owners and the
undeniable detriment of users. In light of such concerns, I have
argued elsewhere against an individual rights-based account of the
copyright system in general, and more specifically, against the use of
32. See Carys J. Craig, Locke, Labour and Limiting the Author’s Right: A
Warning Against a Lockean Approach to Copyright Law, 28 QUEEN’S L.J. 1
(2002) (describing Lockean theory’s role in broadening the scope of author’s
rights); Hogg v. Scott, [1874] 18 L.R. 763, 485 (CH) (“[T]he defendant is not at
liberty to use or avail himself of the labour which the plaintiff has been at for the
purpose of producing his work, that is, in fact, merely to take away the result of
another man’s labour, or, in other words, his property.”).
33. Craig, supra note 32, at 12-15.
34. See e.g., Ladbroke Ltd. v. William Hill Ltd., [1964] 1 ALL ER 465 (HL)
(differentiating between material that requires intellectual work and those that are
banal); Walter v. Lane, [1900] 83 L.T. 289 (HL); Kelly v Morris, [1866] 14 L.T.
222 (CH); MacMillan & Co. v. Cooper, (1923) 40 T.L.R. 186 (India).
35. See Stef van Gompel, Copyright Formalities and the Reasons for Their
Decline in Nineteenth Century Europe, in PRIVILEGE AND PROPERTY: ESSAYS ON
THE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT 157, 191 (Ronan Deazley, Martin Kretschmer &
Lionel Bently eds., 2010) (contrasting the English fixed terms of right to the
unknown terms for other European countries).
36. See generally DEAZELEY, supra note 27 (discussing the underlying public
purposes of the Statute of Anne).
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rights rhetoric to justify the powers granted to authors by copyright
law.37 The deontological claim that authors naturally have rights over
their works casts copyright as a legal structure designed primarily or
exclusively to recognize and protect authors’ independently existing
rights as a matter of justice or entitlement. The private powers
granted by law thus appear to be self-evident, requiring no further
justification, while the public interests at stake become, at best, a
matter of secondary concern. As the following discussion reveals,
when authorial right is a baseline assumption, copyright exceptions
or limitations are inevitably viewed with suspicion, manifesting as
prima facie unjust encroachments upon the natural entitlement of the
worthy, rights-bearing author.

B. THE DEMISE OF FAIR DEALING
The traditional rights-based approach to copyright justifies and
nurtures the tendency to afford always greater protection against
more uses of the work, such that almost any unauthorized use
amounts to unlawful trespass and infringement.38 More specifically,
over the course of the twentieth century, in the Anglo-Canadian law,
rights-based reasoning was employed to limit the scope and
availability of exceptions to infringement, diminishing the
importance of fair uses of protected works, reducing fair dealing to a
narrow and exceptional defense, and essentially marginalizing the
interests of users and the public almost to the point of irrelevance. A
detailed review of the British and Canadian fair dealing provisions
and jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this project,39 but the claim
is neither new nor controversial. There is a clear connection between
37. See CARYS J CRAIG, COPYRIGHT, COMMUNICATION & CULTURE: TOWARDS
RELATIONAL THEORY OF COPYRIGHT LAW (2011) (proposing a teleological
justification for the copyright system that supports protecting works of authorship
only because, and to the extent that, such protection encourages dialogic
participation in a cultural process of creativity and exchange.)
38. Id. at 85-97 (arguing that the individualist rights-based account of copyright
invokes the powerful normative force of natural law in support of author’s claim,
inevitably resulting in the widening of copyright protection contrary to its public
purposes.)
39. See id.; Guiseppina D’Agostino, Healing Fair Dealing?: A Comparative
Copyright Analysis of Canada’s Fair Dealing to U.K. Fair Dealing and U.S. Fair
Use, 53 MCGILL L. REV. 309, 327 (2008) (emphasizing that an analysis of the
Canadian Supreme Court’s interpretation must include an understanding of
Parliament’s policy objectives).
A
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the commitment to protecting authors’ rights as a matter of
entitlement and the limited scope available for successfully asserting
a defense to an infringement claim.
By the early nineteenth century, the fair use or fair dealing defense
developed by the courts had begun to resemble its modern form.40
Although the initial development of a concept of fair use was
somewhat piecemeal, the early cases suggest that fair uses were
judicially recognized because they involved “originality on the part
of the . . . user as manifested in a new work that also promoted the
progress of science and thereby benefited the public.”41 That such
uses were beyond the scope of the copyright owner’s exclusive
domain was at least partly in appreciation of the intellectual effort
expended by the user in the creation of a cognizably ‘new work;’ but
the primary rationale for allowing such uses seems to have been the
public benefit afforded by this ‘newness’—the value of the
defendant’s contribution to knowledge and encouragement of
learning.42 Indeed, a finding of ‘piracy’ was largely reserved for the
cases where no obvious public interest was being served by the
defendant’s copying.43 Courts were able to resolve copyright disputes
without the kind of absolutism typical of a rights-based approach;
40. Macklin v. Richardson, [1770] 27 Eng. Rep. 451 (CH); Dodsley v.
Kinnersley, [1761] 27 Eng. Rep. 270 (CH); Tonson v. Walker, [1752] 36 Eng. Rep.
1017 (App.); Gyles v. Wilcox, [1740] 27 Eng. Rep. 682 (CH) (holding that real
and fair abridgments may be called a new book); see generally ISABELLA
ALEXANDER, COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY (2010).
41. WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 18 (2d
ed. 1995).
42. See, e.g., Scott v. Stanford, [1867] 16 L.T. 51 (L.R. Eq.); D’Alamaine v.
Boosey, [1835] 160 Eng. Rep. 117 (L.R. Exch.); Martin v. Wright, [1833] 58 Eng.
Rep. 605 (L.R. Eq.) (holding that a person may copy and publish literature if
annotated and in connection to his own research); Mawman v. Tegg, [1826] 38
Eng. Rep. 380 (CH).
43. See, e.g., Lewis v. Fullarton, [1839] 48 Eng. Rep. 1080 (CH) (rejecting a
fair use defence on the basis that the defendant had expended “no other labour . . .
than in copying the work”); Roworth v. Wilkes, [1807] 170 Eng. Rep. 889 (KB)
(finding infringement where the defendant’s work simply involved
“communication of the same knowledge”); see generally Kathy Bowrey, On
Clarifying the Role of Originality and Fair Use in 19th Century UK Jurisprudence:
Appreciating “the Humble Grey Which Emerges as the Result of Long
Controversy,” in THE COMMON LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF PROF. DAVID VAVER 45 (Lionel Bently, Giuseppina D’Agostino &
Catherine Ng eds., 2010).
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instead, the concepts of fair abridgment, fair use, and legitimate
taking permitted the nuanced application of copyright in a way that
cohered with the recognized social goals of the copyright system.44
Of course, in an environment where the copyright owner’s right
was limited to the reproduction of a literary work as such, copyright
control was the exception and fair use of a work was the norm.45 In
that context, the idea that users and the public possessed a general
right to deal fairly with the work—in the absence of narrow right
explicitly granted to the copyright owner—was simply assumed.46 As
copyright steadily expanded to provide ever stronger rights over
more works, however, the equitable principle of fair use
correspondingly took root and flourished, becoming an established
part of the British and Commonwealth copyright law until the turn of
the twentieth century.47 As late as 1915, shortly after fair dealing was
statutorily enacted in the U.K. Copyright Act of 1911, the
authoritative treatise writer, W.A. Copinger, made reference to “the
rights of the fair user” that had long been enjoyed under the law.48
Although the 1911 Act enumerated specific purposes for which a
44. See Kylie Pappalardo & Brian Fitzgerald, Copyright, Fair Use and the
Australian Constitution, in COPYRIGHT PERSPECTIVES: PAST, PRESENT AND
PROSPECT 125-64 (Brian Fitzgerald & John Gilchrist eds., 2015) (arguing that,
consistent with the historical development of copyright and fair use, the productive
or fair use of a protected work is not, by definition, an infringing copy capable of
regulation by the copyright system).
45. Pamela Samuelson, Justifications for Copyright Limits and Exceptions, in
COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 12, 16-17 (Ruth L.
Okediji ed., 2017).
46. See id. at 12-59 (noting that, “[w]hen rights were narrow, it was
unnecessary to create exceptions to limit those rights . . . [but] as legislatures
expanded authorial rights . . . the need to create limits on the exclusive rights
became apparent); Videotape: Copyright User Rights and Access to Justice: Q&A
with
Professor
David
Vaver,
(May
18,
2017),
https://ctl2.uwindsor.ca/vidlinks/FF05B3B16B91BBE2.html.
47. Pappalardo & Fitzgerald, supra note 44, at 125-64; see also Ariel Katz,
Fair Use 2.0: The Rebirth of Fair Dealing in Canada, in THE COPYRIGHT
PENTALOGY: HOW THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA SHOOK THE FOUNDATIONS OF
CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW 93, 101-02 (Michael Geist ed., 2013)(arguing that the
widely perceived distinction between U.S.-style open-ended fair use and fair
dealing is a myth).
48. WALTER ARTHUR COPINGER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT, IN WORKS OF
LITERATURE, ART, ARCHITECTURE, PHOTOGRAPHY, MUSIC AND THE DRAMA:
INCLUDING CHAPTERS ON MECHANICAL CONTRIVANCES AND CINEMATOGRAPHS
144 (5th ed. 1915).
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dealing might be fair (private study, research, criticism, review, or
newspaper summary),49 it was Copinger’s assumption that
established user rights to deal fairly with work, which “has always
been . . . permitted”50 for other purposes, were not intended to be cut
down by the new law.
As it happened, the introduction of these statutorily limited fair
dealing purposes did precipitate a steady shift away from an
equitable principle of fair use and towards a restrictive fair dealing
defense.51 The Act was met by the courts with an increasing
formalism in statutory interpretation, and the conceptual elevation of
private property and contractual rights over the public interest
considerations that had previously prevailed.52 The judiciary that had
been so active in developing fair use subsequently proved active in
reining it in.53 Gradually there developed a more restrictive view of
fair dealing as necessarily confined to the list of statutorily approved
purposes which should themselves be narrowly construed as
exceptional.54 As part of the same process, courts increasingly
adopted a bifurcated approach to assessing liability; determining
whether a use was substantial and prima facie infringement before
assessing the availability of a fair dealing defense.55 Put differently,
the courts would first establish the existence of owner’s right and its
violation and only then ask whether a defense might be made out.
Increasingly, any minimally substantial use was regarded as an
incursion onto the property rights of the owner which could be
49. Copyright Act 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5 c. 46, § 2(1)(i) (Eng.) (establishing that
“any fair dealing with any work for the purposes of private study, research,
criticism, review or newspaper summary” would not constitute an infringement of
copyright).
50. COPINGER, supra note 48, at 144.
51. Copyright Act 1911, c. 46, § 2(1)(i).
52. Robert Burrell, Reining in Copyright Law: Is Fair Use the Answer?, 2001
INTELL. PROP. Q. 361 (2001).
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Hawkes & Son Ltd. v. Paramount Film Service Ltd., [1934] 50
T.L.R. 315 (CH); British Oxygen Co. v. Liquid Air Ltd., [1925] 133 L.T. 282
(CH); Alexandra Sims, Strangling Their Creation: The Courts’ Treatment of Fair
Dealing in Copyright Law Since 1911, 2010 INTELL. PROP. Q. 192 (2010).
55. See Hawkes & Son Ltd., at 602 (detailing Lord Hamworth M.R.’s assertion
of substantial taking by asking whether the part taken “is so slender that it would
be impossible to recognize it”); Johnstone v. Bernard Jones Publication, [1938]
159 L.T. 15 (CH).
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excused only in a limited number of specific circumstances.56 The
user’s historical right to deal fairly for any purpose was reduced to a
minimally permitted encroachment on the owner’s exclusive domain.
According to Burrell, the judicially developed fair dealing defense
had been no more than a necessary limit on the massive expansion of
copyright that took place, largely at the hands of the same judiciary,
since the enactment of the Statute of Anne.57 From this perspective,
the subsequent cases that dramatically narrowed the Fair Use
principle “look much less like an attempt to step back from an overly
broad judicially created exception and much more like a further
extension of owners’ rights.”58 While the perception of copyright as
the author/owner’s proprietary right grew throughout the latter part
of the nineteenth and much of the twentieth century, the Fair Use
doctrine found itself on increasingly uncertain footing. The resultant
fair dealing defense, thus, came to reflect little more than “a reluctant
but necessary concession to users”59 on which it was unwise for
anyone to rely.
Throughout the twentieth century, the fair dealing defense suffered
a similar fate before the Canadian courts.60 It was bound too tightly
to the same strict statutory language and unable to escape the
prevalent assumption that use of an another’s work without
permission was de facto unfair.61 The tendency amongst Canadian
courts was to reject the fair dealing defense because the use was
necessarily unfair,62 or because it was not for an enumerated

56. See Hawkes & Son Ltd., at 315.
57. Burrell, supra note 52, at 367-73.
58. Id. at 367.
59. See Melissa de Zwart, A Historical Analysis of the Birth of Fair Dealing
and Fair Use: Lessons for the Digital Age, 2007 INTELL. PROP. Q. 60, 90 (2007).
60. Katz, supra note 47, at 101-02.
61. Id.
62. E.g., R. v. James Lorimer & Co., [1984] 1 F.C. 1065, 1075 (Can. C.A.)
(finding the defendant’s abridgement of a government report to be unfair because
the defence requires “some dealing with the work other than simply condensing it
into an abridged version.”); Zamacois v. Douville, [1943] 2 D.L.R. 257, 284-85
(Can. Ex. Ct.) (denying fair dealing because “a critic cannot, without being guilty
of infringement, reproduce in full, without the author’s permission, the work which
he criticizes.”); B.W. Int’l Inc. v. Thomson Canada Ltd., [1996] 137 D.L.R. 4th
398, 409 (Can. Ont. Gen. Div.) (holding that the publication of a leaked work
cannot be fair).
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purpose.63 But perhaps the most striking example of the restrictive
interpretation of enumerated purposes is found in Cie Générale des
Etablissement Michelin-Michelin & Cie. v. C.A.W. –Canada64 which
held that the defendants’ parody of a corporate logo could not be
included within the category of “criticism.”65 Justice Teitlebaum
emphasized throughout his reasons that the objectives of copyright
law are “[t]he protection of authors and ensuring that they are
recompensed for their creative energies and works.”66 Rejecting the
defendants’ free speech argument, Justice Teitlebaum reasoned:
In the balance of interest and rights, if the Defendants have no right to use
the Plaintiff’s [work], they have a multitude of other means for expressing
their views. However, if the Plaintiff loses its right to control the use of its
copyright, there is little left to the Plaintiff’s right of private property.67

It was held that the users had no right to use the plaintiff’s work;
their constitutional right to free expression could extend no further
than the boundaries of the plaintiff’s property.68 I have argued
elsewhere that the Michelin court’s commitment to the idea of
copyright as the owner’s property right caused it to reify the
boundaries of the corporation’s exclusive domain and overlook the
social values at stake in the defendant’s political use of the plaintiff’s
logo/work. The elevation of the plaintiff’s right justified prohibiting
the defendant’s speech, and disregarded the transformative and
expressive nature of the defendant’s downstream use.69 The
defendant Union’s claim of right to fair dealing and free expression
63. E.g., Hager v. ECW Press Ltd., [1999] 2 F.C. 287, 304 (Can. Fed. Ct.)
(finding that a biography was not a work of research because “the use
contemplated by private study and research is not one in which the copied work is
communicated to the public.”); Boudreau v. Lin, [1997] 150 D.L.R. 4th 324, 331
(Can. Ont. Gen. Div.) (holding that a university’s copying and sale of course
materials was not for the purposes of “private study” because the materials were
distributed to all members of a class).
64. [1996] 71 C.P.R. 3d 348 (Can. Fed. Ct.).
65. Id. at 381.
66. Id. at 376-77 (defining the objectives of the Act as being to protect “the
interests of authors and copyright holders”).
67. Id. at 377.
68. Id. at 376.
69. See generally Carys J. Craig, Putting the Community in Communication:
Dissolving the Conflict Between Freedom of Expression and Copyright, 56 U.
TORONTO L.J. 75, 83-84, 93 (2006) [Craig, Putting the Community in
Communication] (reviewing Canadian copyright cases and law).
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simply ceded to the copyright owner’s right.70
This brings us to the landmark case of CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law
Soc’y of Upper Can..71 The defendant, the Great Library of Osgoode
Hall, argued that its photocopy service was provided for the purpose
of research or private study. The plaintiff publishers responded that it
is the purpose only of the person dealing with the work (the library
staff member) that is relevant—not the purposes of the researchers
for whom copies were made.72 At first instance, Justice Gibson
agreed:
The copying by the defendant . . . was not for a purpose within the
ambit of fair dealing notwithstanding that the ultimate use by the
requester of the photocopying might itself be within the ambit of fair
dealing . . . I am satisfied that the fair dealing exception should be
strictly construed.73
As the foregoing would suggest, this judgment was characteristic
of the narrow confines within which the fair dealing defense had
been drawn,74 reflecting the overarching concern in Canada’s
copyright tradition with the protection of author’s rights. The claim
that fair dealing should be subject to strict construction—a claim
peppered throughout the Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence on fair
dealing prior to CCH—flows from the conviction that fair dealing is
exceptional and antithetical to the normative presupposition of the
copyright system; namely, that the author has the right to exclusive
control over the work. Indeed, Justice Gibson began his analysis by
stating:
70. See id. at 82. See also Jane Bailey, Deflating the Michelin Man in IN THE
PUBLIC INTEREST: THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW (Michael Geist ed.
2005); Bita Amani, Copyright and Freedom of Expression: Fair Dealing Between
Work and Play in DYNAMIC FAIR DEALING: CREATING CANADIAN CULTURE
ONLINE (Rosemary J. Coombe, Darren Wershler and Martin Zellinger eds. 2013);
Graham J. Reynolds, Moving Past Michelin: Towards Judicial Reconsideration of
the Intersection of Copyright and the Charter Right to Freedom of Expression
(2017) 30 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL (Forthcoming).
71. [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339 (Can.).
72. Id. at 385.
73. Id. at 403.
74. Contra Allen v. Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd., [1997], 36 O.R. 3d 201
(Can. Ont. Gen. Div.) (finding that the reproduction of a photograph was fair
dealing for the purposes of news reporting because the entire work was copied);
Allen v. Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd., [1995], 26 O.R. 3d 208 (Can. Ont. Gen.
Div.) (noting that there was no substantial reproduction of the plaintiff’s work).
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The object and purpose of the Copyright Act is to benefit authors, albeit
that in benefiting authors, it is capable of having a substantially broaderbased public benefit through the encouragement of disclosure of works
for the advancement of learning or, as in this case, the wider
dissemination of law.75

This was in line with the Supreme Court’s earlier insistence, in the
1990 decision of Bishop v. Stevens, that the “single object” of the
Copyright Act was “the benefit of authors of all kinds.”76 Notably,
the Court in that case had similarly insisted upon a narrow reading of
the statutory exceptions available to users in the Act.77 Once again,
where copyright was regarded as solely or even primarily aimed at
protecting the rights of the author/owner, the user’s claim to fair
dealing lost out to the copyright owner’s right of exclusive control.
The powers conferred on authors to control their works have
steadily strengthened in scope and form owing, at least in part, to the
persistent presence of rights-based reasoning and rhetoric in the
Anglo common law tradition. While twentieth-century Canada offers
a compelling example, similar patterns emerged in different contexts
around the globe at both the domestic and the international level.78
Wherever one looks, it seems clear that deontological explanations
for copyright law, framed in natural rights rhetoric and loaded with
presumptions of moral entitlement, inevitably support the expansive
protection of copyright and circumscribe the uses that might lawfully
be made of works that fall within the perceived scope of the author’s
75. CCH Canadian v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., 1 S.C.R. at 388.
76. [1990] 2 S.C.R. 467 (Can.) (citing Performing Right Society, Ltd. v.
Hammond’s Bradford Brewery Co., [1934] 1 Ch. 121, 127 (C.A.)).
77. Id. at 480-81 (“an implied exception . . . is all the more unlikely . . . in light
of the detailed and explicit exemptions in [the Act]”); see also Michelin v. CAW –
Can., [1996] 71 C.P.R. 3d 348, 381 (Can. Fed. Ct.).
78. See Justice Laddie, Copyright: Over-Strength, Over-Regulated, OverRated?, 18 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 253, 259 (1996) (arguing that the narrow
confines of the U.K.’s fair dealing defense reflects “a complacent certainty that
wider copyright protection is morally and economically justified”); Neil Netanel,
Israeli Fair Use from an American Perspective, in CREATING RIGHTS: READINGS
IN COPYRIGHT LAW (Michael Birnhack & Guy Pessach eds., 2009) (describing the
“market approach” to fair use discernable in some U.S. case law, wherein fair use
is regarded as a narrow, anomalous exception to the copyright holder’s exclusive
and broad proprietary rights); Pappalardo & Fitzgerald, supra note 44 (describing
the historical development of fair use in the Australian context); Sims, supra note
17, at 178 (arguing for expanded fair use in the New Zealand context).
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right. What is also apparent, however, is that the continual expansion
of copyright owners’ rights has met with growing attention to the
burdens that copyright law places on members of the public, both as
consumers and as citizens. Over time, and with more or less success,
copyright limits, exceptions and defenses have thus evolved,
“typically [to temper] the reach of these broad rights.”79 By the turn
of the twenty-first century, with the proliferation of digital
technologies, the public’s new creative and consumptive capabilities
had come head-to-head with content owners’ greater capacity to
control access, use, and sharing. As Niva Elkin-Koren explains,
“[t]he rise of user rights is linked to fundamental changes in the
creative ecosystem that pull in [these] opposite directions.”80 It is to
the emergence of “user rights” that we now turn, picking up the trail
in Canada where the Supreme Court issued, in 2004, what remains as
“one of the strongest pro-user rights decisions from any high court in
the world.”81

C. THE RISE OF USER RIGHTS IN CANADA
In order to understand how such a dramatic change in the fate of
fair dealing could play out against the Canadian jurisprudential
backdrop described above, we must first take note of the Supreme
Court judgment released shortly after Justice Gibson’s lower court
ruling in CCH; the pivotal case of Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit
Champlain Inc..82 Meera Nair explains the relevance of that case for
user rights and the public domain:
It has been only in the new millennium that the rights of the public
began to gain attention. In this regard, CCH Canadian was not the
watershed moment; that distinction was earned two years earlier in
[Théberge]. Even though the case had nothing to do with fair
dealing, Justice Binnie, writing for the majority, decisively placed
owners’ rights in service of the vitality of the public domain, and

79. Samuelson, Justifications for Copyright Limits, supra note 45, at 1.
80. Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright in a Digital Ecosystem: A User-Rights
Approach, in COPYRIGHT IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 132, 135
(Ruth L. Okediji ed., 2015).
81. Michael Geist, Low Tech Case Has High Impact, (Mar. 21, 2004),
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2004/03/low-tech-case-has-high-tech-impact/.
82. [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336 (Can.).
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made particular mention of the role of exceptions.83
In Théberge, the Supreme Court articulated, for the first time, the
idea that copyright is not primarily for the benefit of authors but is
rather a “balance between promoting the public interest in the
encouragement and dissemination of works of the arts and intellect
and obtaining a just reward for the creator;” stating that “[t]he proper
balance among these and other public policy objectives lies not only
in recognizing the creator’s rights but in giving due weight to their
limited nature.”84 While the so-called Théberge Balance was
portrayed by the Court as merely describing how copyright is
“usually presented,” in truth it represented a seismic shift in the
copyright landscape.85 Suddenly, the public interest had weight on
the justice scales of copyright—perhaps even a weight equal to that
of the creator’s right. What had previously been an ownership right,
subject only to narrow and exceptional limitations, became a right
that had to be weighed against a variety of other interests and public
policy objectives.
As Nair implies, most importantly for our purposes, the limits to
which the author’s rights are subject—the public interests that
circumscribe the author’s claim—are given a positive dimension in
the following passage from the case:
Excessive control by holders of copyrights and other forms of
intellectual property may unduly limit the ability of the public
domain to incorporate and embellish creative innovation in the longterm interests of society as a whole, or create practical obstacles to
proper utilization. This is reflected in the exceptions to copyright
infringement . . . which seek to protect the public domain in
traditional ways such as fair dealing[.]86
Cast in this light, fair dealing and other exceptions are not
encroachments upon the creator’s rights but rather prevent the
encroachment of creators’ rights into the public domain. Exceptions
83. Meera Nair, CCH Canadian: Ten Years Later, FAIR DUTY (Feb. 25, 2014,
6:37 AM), https://fairduty.wordpress.com/2014/02/25/ten-years-later/.
84. Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain Inc., 2 S.C.R. at 355.
85. Meera Nair, Fairness of Use: Different Journeys, in THE COPYRIGHT
PENTALOGY: HOW THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA SHOOK THE FOUNDATIONS OF
CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW 235, 235 (Michael Geist ed. 2013).
86. Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain Inc., 2 S.C.R. at 356.
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remove copyright-created obstacles to the proper use of works. With
that, the Canadian stage was set for the entrance of users’ rights.
Following Théberge, the Federal Court of Appeal ruled in the
CCH case, citing the need for balance and refusing to subject the fair
dealing provisions to the traditionally narrow interpretation dominant
in Canadian courts.87 Rather than casting fair dealing as a limited
derogation from the norms of copyright law, Justice Linden
explained that “user rights are not just loopholes” and are therefore
deserving of a “fair and balanced reading.”88 The majority rejected
Justice Gibson’s position that merely facilitating research was not
research per se,89 and building on the multifactorial U.S. Fair Use
Test,90 provided a principled survey of the “malleable” factors
relevant to assessing fairness.91
The resurrection of public interest played a similarly pivotal role
and was “given added thrust”92 in the Supreme Court’s ruling in
CCH. Writing for a unanimous court, Chief Justice McLaughlin
endorsed the statement that “user rights are not just loopholes.”93 She
stated that “research,” as an enumerated fair dealing purpose, “must
be given a large and liberal interpretation in order to ensure that
users’ rights are not unduly constrained.”94 The court’s new concern
with the public purposes of the Copyright Act demanded renewed
87. CCH Canadian v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., 1 S.C.R. at 384 (holding that
the trial judge erred in law when he stated that exceptions to infringement must be
“strictly construed,” because an overly restrictive interpretation of the exemptions
contained in the Act would be inconsistent with the mandate of copyright law to
harmonize owners’ rights with legitimate public interests).
88. Id. (quoting DAVID VAVER, COPYRIGHT LAW 171 (2000)
89. Id. at 387 (“In essence the Law Society can vicariously claim an individual
end user’s fair dealing exemption, and step into the shoes of its patron.”).
90. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (enumerating an inclusive list of four factors to be
considered in determining whether a use is fair: “(1) the purpose and character of
the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;
and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work”).
91. CCH Canadian v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., 1 S.C.R. at 342 (assessing the
purpose, nature, and amount of the dealing, the nature of the work, the likely effect
of the dealing, and the availability of alternatives to the dealing).
92. Nair, supra note 83.
93. CCH Canadian v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., 1 S.C.R. at 364.
94. Id. at 342.
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focus on the user of copyrighted material and the uses to which
protected works may freely be put. Adopting the multi-factor enquiry
and engaging in a careful analysis of the interests in the balance at
each stage, the court set the tone for an entirely different approach to
fair dealing and other exceptions, bestowed with the title of “users’
rights” as copyright marched into the digital age (where cases would
soon take judges far beyond the comfort zone of library photocopiers
and case digests).95
The adoption of the language of “user rights” is arguably the most
striking manifestation of the inclusion of the public as a primary
beneficiary of the copyright system whose interests therefore factor
directly into the copyright “balance.” The broad reading of fair
dealing that this entailed reflects the evolving role of users in
Canadian copyright policy. As Drassinower explains: “the defence of
fair dealing . . . is to be understood and deployed not negatively, as a
mere exception, but rather positively, as a user right integral to
copyright law.”96 The copyright holder’s interest in excluding others
from its work has always benefited from the label of “right;”
consequently, when owners’ rights have appeared to conflict with
users’ interests in dealing with the protected work, the owners’ rights
have readily prevailed. When the abstract concept of the public
interest found more concrete expression in the form of users’ rights,
its fate within the fair dealing analysis suddenly seemed brighter—
and its weight on copyright’s balancing scales heavier. As Vaver
writes: “If the Copyright Act is to balance the activities of owners
and users honestly, it must balance similar entities. Balancing rights
against exceptions starts off with the scales biased towards rights and
against exceptions.”97
The CCH fair dealing ruling proved to be, not an outlier but, an
initial indicator of a fundamental and sustained shift in the way that
Canadian courts approach exceptions and defenses to copyright
infringement. In 2012, the Supreme Court heard five copyright cases
together, all of which involved appeals from decisions of the
Copyright Board responsible for setting and approving licenses and

95. Id.
96. Drassinower, supra note 12, at 467.
97. David Vaver, User Rights, 25 INTELL. PROP. J. 105, 109 (2013).
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tariff for collective societies.98 Two of these cases—Bell v. Society of
Composers, Authors, and Music Publishers of Canada99 and Alberta
v. Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency100—directly addressed the
interpretation and application of the fair dealing provisions postCCH. It was argued before the court that the decision to characterize
fair dealing as a “user’s right” had been in error and misconstrued the
nature of defenses within the copyright regime.101 Rather than
retreating from this assertion of fair dealing as a user right, however,
the Supreme Court took the opportunity to reiterate the rights-based
nature of fair dealing within copyright,102 and to accord a
correspondingly large and liberal interpretation to the statutory
wording of the defense.
Thus, in Bell, which concerned the streaming of samples of
musical works to consumers, Justice Abella found the activity to be
consumer “research” and the communication by the online distributer
to be “facilitating” such research.103 Taking the perspective of the
user/consumer rather than the online-service provider when assessing
the purpose of the dealing, Justice Abella explained: “This is
consistent with the Court’s approach in CCH, where it described fair
dealing as a ‘user’s right.’”104 In Alberta, a case that concerned the
fraught question of educational copying by teachers for classroom
use, the court again restated the rights-based nature of the
defendant’s claim: “[F]air dealing is a “‘user’s right’, and the
relevant perspective when considering whether the dealing is for an

98. See generally THE COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY: HOW THE SUPREME COURT OF
CANADA SHOOK THE FOUNDATIONS OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW (Michael
Geist ed. 2013) (discussing issues raised by the five copyright decisions
particularly, fair dealing, user rights, and the technology-neutral approach to
copyright law).
99. 2 S.C.R. at 326.
100. 2 S.C.R. at 345.
101. See Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Can., 2 S.C.R. at
335.
102. Id. at 333 (“CCH confirmed that users’ rights are an essential part of
furthering the public interest objectives of the Copyright Act. One of the tools
employed to achieve the proper balance between protection and access in the Act is
the concept of fair dealing, which allows users to engage in some activities that
might otherwise amount to copyright infringement.”).
103. Id. at 334-35.
104. Id. at 338.

2017]

GLOBALIZING USER RIGHTS-TALK

25

allowable purpose . . . is that of the user.”105 With this in mind, the
court reasoned that the student/user who is engaged in research and
public study shares a “symbiotic purpose” with the teacher/copier
who may therefore benefit from the fair dealing defense.106 The
nature of fair dealing as a user right demanded a “large and liberal”
reading of the statutory defense.107 The constraints imposed on the
scope of fair dealing by the Copyright Board were therefore found to
be unreasonable. Many of the copies for which remuneration was
sought were within the realm of the user’s right to deal fairly with
works for research and private study.
Another 2012 case before the court addressed a broadcasting
regulatory regime that allowed broadcasters to control the
simultaneous retransmission of local televisions signals. Because the
Copyright Act contains an exception for such signals,108 which the
court understood to be a “user’s right” and, therefore, “beyond the
owner’s control,”109 it was held that the regulatory regime was ultra
vires. Allowing the value for signal regime would “upset the aim of
the Copyright Act to effect an appropriate ‘balance’” between
authors’ and users’ rights.110 The court described the copyright
system in the following terms:
The Copyright Act is concerned both with encouraging creativity
and providing reasonable access to the fruits of creative endeavor.
These objectives are furthered by a carefully balanced scheme that
creates exclusive economic rights for different categories of
copyright[.] It also provides user rights such as fair dealing and
specific exemptions that enable the general public or specific classes
of users to access protected material under certain conditions.111
As Myra Tawfik has argued, the court’s recognition of users’
rights “to access” certain protected material effects a subtle but
105. Alberta, 2 S.C.R. at 360.
106. Id. at 361.
107. Id. at 359-60.
108. Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-42, ¶ 31 (Can.).
109. Reference re Broadcasting Regulatory Policy CRTC 2010-167 and
Broadcasting Order CRTC 2010-168, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 489, ¶ 58 (Can.); see
Alberta, 2 S.C.R. at 370.
110. Reference re Broadcasting Regulatory Policy CRTC 2010-167, 2 S.C.R. ¶
67.
111. Id. ¶ 36.
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meaningful development in the judicial conceptualization of defenses
and their role in the copyright scheme: “[S]peaking in terms of
‘access’ centers the discussion more squarely on the individual’s
engagement as a user within the legislative scheme in the sense that
access is provided to someone.”112 “Framed in terms of balance, what
this means is that the rights of the copyright holder to protection
must be weighed against the user’s right of access.”113 This in turn
suggests growing appreciation of the importance of access to
intellectual works as foundational, both within the copyright system
and within democratic culture more broadly.114 In Tawfik’s terms, the
“Canadian cases represent ‘a welcome affirmation of individuality
[of users] within the larger international and comparative copyright
contexts.’”115
The Canadian copyright context thus provides an illustrative
example of the apparent power of the concept of users’ rights to
actively shift the balance between owners and users in the copyright
system, strengthening users’ demands to constrain copyright
(including by resisting the expansion of owner rights into new
technological contexts). It is sufficient, I hope, to convince the reader
that what might be considered merely semantic (the recognition of a
“user right”) can in fact be a powerful legal tool that reaps practical
results for users of copyright works and for the public interest in
general. As noted at the outset, however, this is not only a Canadian
story. While it may be said that “the Supreme Court of Canada has
charted a decidedly Canadian approach to surveying the boundary
between copyright protection and a ‘robustly cultured and
intellectual public domain,’”116 the trajectory of users’ rights in
Canadian jurisprudence could equally be regarded as indicative of a
larger transnational shift in our understanding of copyright law and
the interests at stake. As the next section explains, the Canadian
example does not simply result in, but also reflects, a growing
112. Tawfik, supra note 12, at 198.
113. Id.
114. See Laura J. Murray, Copyright Talk: Patterns and Pitfalls in Canadian
Policy Discourses, in IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN
COPYRIGHT LAW 15, 39 (Michael Geist ed. 2005) (arguing that a culture of public
intellectual domains is sustained through access).
115. Tawfik, supra note 12, at 200.
116. Id.
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recognition of users as individual rights-bearers within the copyright
regime writ large.

D. THE COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL TRAJECTORY OF
USERS’ RIGHTS
It is widely agreed that the most open and expansive approach to
copyright exceptions can be found in the U.S. doctrine of fair use.117
Without statutory limits as to the possible purposes for which fair use
can be found, the fair use defense is flexible in its application and
potentially broad in its scope. Fair use owes its origin to the British
fair abridgement cases,118 but did not suffer the fate of fair dealing
post-1911, continuing its judicial evolution up to and beyond its
codification in 1976. Given the U.S. constitutional scheme wherein
copyright’s purpose is explicitly “to promote the progress of science
and the useful arts,”119 the defense has also been somewhat less
vulnerable than in the Commonwealth context to the rigid
enforcement and prioritization of owners’ proprietary rights. In
weighing the various factors for consideration in assessing the
fairness of a use,120 it is common for courts to invoke the rights and
interests of the author or owner but also those of the user and public
at large; typically with a view to copyright’s constitutional
purpose.121 As such, the extent to which a use transforms a protected
work—adding new meaning or purpose—has become a key factor in
determining the lawfulness of a use.122 Since 2005, as Neil Netanel
117. See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
118. Matthew Sag, The Pre-History of Fair Use, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1371, 1373
(2011).
119. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
120. See CCH Canadian v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., 1 S.C.R. at 342.
121. See Pamela Samuelson, Possible Futures of Fair Use, 90 WASH. L. REV.
815, 857 (2015) (describing a variety of policy-relevant “clusters” of fair use cases,
including: free speech and expression uses, authorship-promoting uses, and uses
that promote learning).
122. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. at 579; Pierre N. Leval,
Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990) (suggesting
that, when considering the purpose of a use, courts should ask: “[D]id the use
fulfill the objective of copyright law to stimulate creativity for public
illumination?”); see generally Amy Adler, Fair Use and the Future of Art, 91
N.Y.U. L. REV. 559, 625-26 (2016) (disputing the capacity of the
tranformativeness test to advance rather than stifle artistic creativity); Laura A.
Heymann, Everything Is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader Response, 31
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445, 447 (2008) (arguing that assessing tranformativity with a
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has shown, the “transformative use” approach has come to dominate
the U.S. case law: “[This] paradigm views fair use as integral to
copyright’s purpose of promoting widespread dissemination of
creative expression, not a disfavored exception to copyright holders’
exclusive rights.”123 Framed as such, fair use is closely tied to the
free speech rights of users, ensuring copyright’s purpose as an
“engine of free expression” by acting as a “built-in free speech
safeguard.”124 When U.S. courts and commentators invoke the idea
of fair use as a matter of right, it is typically framed with the
constitutional right of free speech or freedom of the press in mind.125
It should be stressed, if only in passing, that fair use is not always
or consistently accorded an expansive interpretation in the U.S.
courts, notwithstanding its potential breadth. Indeed, its application
is notoriously unpredictable, and courts, in their consideration of the
relevant factors, often seem guided by underlying normative
commitments to copyright as a moral entitlement or an economic
right of the author/owner.126 They are also, of course, vulnerable to
view to reader response, and not only authorial intent, changes the scope of
transformative fair use); Samuelson, Possible Futures of Fair Use, supra note 121,
at 817-18 (asserting that the influence of Campbell and its progeny may yet extend
well beyond the current doctrine of transformative use); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy
This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves
It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 537 (2004) (arguing that the emphasis on transformation has
limited awareness of the free speech considerations implicated by simple copying).
123. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 715, 736 (2011).
124. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219, 221 (2003) (citing Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)).
125. See, e.g., NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 63 (2008)
(providing a thoughtful account of copyright and fair use as being explicitly
grounded in First Amendment values); L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W.
LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS’ RIGHTS 123-24 (1991);
Malla Pollack, A Listener’s Free Speech, A Reader’s Copyright, 35 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1457, 1460 (2007); Tushnet, supra note 122, at 587, 589-90 (explaining the
connections between fair use and free speech under the First Amendment).
126. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
558 (1985) (quoting Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos.
Inc., 621 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1980)) (“The fair use doctrine is not a license for
corporate theft, empowering a court to ignore a copyright whenever it determines
the underlying work contains material of possible public importance.”); Worldwide
Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, 227 F.3d 1110, 1115 (9th Cir. 2000)
(holding that the not-for-profit reproduction of an out-of-print book for religious
and educational purposes was not fair use); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin
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the typical judicial ailments of result-based reasoning, ideological
bias, and ad hocery.127 For many years, a persistent “market-centred
approach” to fair use led courts to view it as “an anomalous
exception to the copyright owner’s exclusive rights, applicable only
in cases of irremediable market failure.”128 In this context, the force
of fair use was frequently undermined by an undue emphasis on the
commercial purpose of a use or the effect on the market of the
plaintiff’s work.129 Even with an explicitly instrumental vision of
copyright’s purpose, the economic incentive rationale slides easily
into economic reward, then desert, such that protection of the
owner’s right effectively becomes the end in itself.130
Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1369 (N.D. Ga. 2001), rev’d 268 F.3d 1257(11th Cir.
2001) (describing Alice Randall’s radical retelling of Margaret Mitchell’s Gone
with the Wind from the perspective of a slave as “unabated piracy”); see generally,
Neil W. Netanel, Why has Copyright Expanded? Analysis and Critique, in 6 NEW
DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 3, 13-14 (Fiona Macmillan ed., 2007) (arguing, on
the basis of these and other examples, that lower courts have been receptive to
private property and piracy rhetoric and thus have narrowly interpreted exceptions
to copyright holder’s rights).
127. See Ann Bartow, Fair Use and the Fairer Sex: Gender, Feminism, and
Copyright Law, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 551, 566-68 (2006)
(providing an interesting perspective on ideological bias at work in fair use);
Andrew Gilden, Raw Materials and the Creative Process, 104 GEO. L.J. 355, 39496 (2016); Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, supra note 123, at 718 (noting that
it would be absurd to expect some pristine standard of legal reasoning in fair use
cases that no other area of law can provide); Rebecca Tushnet, My Fair Ladies:
Sex, Gender, and Fair Use in Copyright, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L.
273, 295-300 (2007).
128. Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, supra note 123, at 734.
129. See John Tehranian, Et Tu, Fair Use? The Triumph of Natural-Law
Copyright, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 465, 500-03 (2005) (arguing that the courts’
approach to fairness and, in particular, the emphasis on the fourth factor privileges
the inherent property interests of authors in the fruits of their labor over the
utilitarian goal of progress in the arts).
130. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. at219, n. 18 (2003) (“As we have
explained, ‘[t]he economic philosophy behind the [Copyright] [C]lause . . . is the
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way
to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors’ . . .
[r]ewarding authors for their creative labor and ‘promot[ing] . . . [p]rogress’ are
thus complementary; as James Madison observed, in copyright ‘[t]he public good
fully coincides . . . with the claims . . . of individuals’ . . . [c]opyright law serves
public ends by providing individuals with an incentive to pursue private ones.”);
see generally Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and
Social Values in Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 841, 850 (1993)
(describing “the tendency to develop robust doctrines of individual moral
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Arguably, even now, the full force of fair use in the U.S. courts
remains constrained by its categorization as an affirmative defense,131
such that the burden falls on the defendant to make out fair use
(rather than a plaintiff bearing the burden of establishing both prima
facie infringement and the absence of fair use).132 Ned Snow
contends that, as originally inherited from the English courts, fair use
was readily conceived of as a matter of right:
Like their English counterparts, courts in the U.S. treated the principles of
fair use as definitional to the issue of infringement: fair-use principles
determined . . . the scope of a copyright holder’s rights. As definitional to
infringement, fair use implied that the user held a presumptive right to use
the copyrighted expression absent a showing otherwise.133

Indeed, in his authoritative 1847 treatise, George Ticknow Curtis
described as “one of the great tasks of jurisprudence” administering
copyright law in a manner that did not curtail “the right to a fair use
by any writer of all that has been recorded by previous authors.”134
According to Snow, the idea of fair use as a right receded over the
course of the twentieth century as U.S. courts shifted the burden of
proof away from the plaintiff (to prove that a defendant’s use was
unfair),135 onto the defendant (to prove the fairness of the use).136
entitlement even within the social policy framework”).
131. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. at 590 (citing Harper &
Row, 471 U. S. at 561); H.R. Rep. No. 102-836, at 3 (1992); see also Cambridge
Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 2014).
132. See Lydia Pallas Loren, Fair Use: An Affirmative Defense?, 90 WASH. L.
REV. 685, 688-91 (2015) (arguing that courts could and should shift the burden to
the plaintiff in fair use cases); Samuelson, Possible Futures of Fair Use, supra
note 121, at 854, n. 259 (arguing that Campbell erred in asserting that fair use was
an affirmative defense but noting that this has not unduly burdened defendants
asserting fair use in practice); Ned Snow, The Forgotten Right of Fair Use, 62
CASE W. RES. L. REV 135, 153 (2012) (acknowledging that where the burden of
proof lies may not significantly affect the fair use analysis if approached as a
matter of law but noting that the burden was very relevant in the past when fair use
was more commonly treated as an issue of fact).
133. Snow, supra note 132, at 144.
134. GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 237
(1847); Snow, supra note 132, at n. 82.
135. See, e.g., Simms v. Stanton, 75 F. 6, 13 (N.D. Cal. 1896) (ruling for the
defendant-user on the basis that the copyright holder had failed to satisfy his
burden of proving that the use was unfair); Snow, supra note 132, at 152.
136. Snow, supra note 132, at 155-56 (tracing the “paradigm shift” to an
unsubstantiated statement by Richard DeWolf in his treatise AN OUTLINE OF

2017]

GLOBALIZING USER RIGHTS-TALK

31

With that mistake, contends Snow, fair use was changed “from a
right of speech to an excuse for infringement.”137 The shifting burden
of proof was itself the natural consequence of a more fundamental
paradigm shift by which fair use, as widely conceived, morphed from
a non-infringing use beyond the scope of the owner’s right into a
technical infringement excusable only on an exceptional basis.138
Even an affirmative defense can be a matter of right, however,139
and certain U.S. commentators and judges have argued that fair use
is properly understood as such. In Bateman v. Mnemonics, Judge
Birch wrote: “Although the traditional approach is to view ‘fair use’
as an affirmative defense, this writer, speaking only for himself, is of
the opinion that it is better viewed as a right granted by the
Copyright Act of 1976.”140 More recently, in Lenz v Universal Music
Corp., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Justice Birch’s
characterization of fair use, writing: “even if . . . fair use is classified
as an ‘affirmative defense,’ [it] is uniquely situated in copyright law
so as to be treated differently than traditional affirmative
defenses.”141 Casting fair use not as an excusable infringement but as
a non-infringing use authorized by law, the court cited in support
Section 108(f)(4) of the Copyright Act, which refers to the “the right
of fair use as provided by section 107.”142 On the basis of the Ninth
Circuit ruling in Lenz, it can now be argued that “the ability to make
fair use of works without permission from the rights-holder is an
COPYRIGHT LAW 143 (1925) that fair use was a “use technically forbidden by the
law, but allowed as reasonable and customary on the theory that the author must
have foreseen it and tacitly consented to it”).
137. Id. at 137.
138. Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and
Liberal Values in Early American Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186, 229 (2009)
(arguing that the foundational articulation of fair use in the United States, by
Justice Story in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841), had
already introduced the notion that all uses were presumptively unfair unless found
to be fair).
139. See Haochen Sun, Fair Use as a Collective User Right, 90 N.C. L. REV.
125, 145-46 (2011) (analogizing the assertion of fair use as an affirmative defense
to self-defense). I am grateful to Peter Jaszi for an illuminating discussion on this
point.
140. 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 n.22 (11th Cir. 1996).
141. 815 F.3d 1145, 1153 (9th Cir. 2016).
142. 17 U.S.C.A. § 108(f)(4) (West 2017) (“Nothing in this section in any way
affects the right of fair use as provided by section 107.”).
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affirmative right that is central to copyright law.”143
It remains fair to say, however, that, on the whole, “the
conceptualization of fair use as a user right has . . . been little
judicially recognized in the United States.”144 David Vaver, Niva
Elkin-Koren and others145 argue in favor of a more explicit embrace
of “user rights” as such—that is, beyond the general sense that fair
use is undergirded by the user’s individual right of free speech.146
Pamela Samuelson writes:
[I]nsofar as fair use is the mechanism by which First Amendment interests
of second comers can be vindicated, one would think that just as speakers
have First Amendment rights, they should have fair use rights, at least as
to critical commentary. The Canadian Supreme Court has endorsed the
view that its copyright law’s fair dealing provision creates ‘user rights,’ so
perhaps U.S. courts should follow that high court’s lead.147

In Israel, meanwhile, where a fair use defense modelled on
Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act was adopted in 2007,148
attention has similarly turned to the question of whether fair use
143. Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation and Public
Knowledge in Support of Defendant-Cross-Appellant and Affirmance at 15-16,
Oracle Am., Inc., v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (No. 17-1118)
(arguing that “[i]n reality, and as the Ninth Circuit has expressly concluded [in
Lenz], the ability to make fair use of works without permission from the
rightsholder is an affirmative right that is central to copyright law”).
144. David Vaver, Copyright Defenses as User Rights, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
U.S. 661, 667 (2013).
145. Hugh Breakey, User’s Rights and the Public Domain, 3 INTELL. PROP. Q.
312, 323 (2010); Elkin-Koren, supra note 19, at 42; Vaver, supra note 144, at 667;
see Drassinower, supra note 12, at 479.
146. See Sun, supra note 139, at 146 (observing that “what undergirds the fair
use defense . . . is the need to protect the user’s own individual rights, such as the
rights of education and freedom of expression.”).
147. Samuelson, Possible Futures of Fair Use, supra note 121, at 857.
148. Copyright Act, 2007, 5768-2008, § 19 (Isr.) (permitting fair use for
purposes such as private study, research, criticism, review, journalistic reporting,
quotation, or instruction and examination by an educational institution); see Orit
Fischman Afori, An Open Standard “Fair Use” Doctrine: A Welcome Israeli
Initiative, 30 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 85, 85 (2008); Guy Pessach, The New
Israeli Copyright Act – A Case-Study in Reverse Comparative Law, 41 INT’L REV.
INTELL. PROP. COMPETITION L. 187, 189-90 (2010); Lior Zemer, Copyright
Departures: The Fall of the Last Imperial Copyright Dominion and the Case of
Fair Use, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 1051, 1068 (2011).
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constitutes a user right. In 2009, in the case of Football Association
Premier League Ltd v. Anonymous, Justice Agmon-Gonen opined
that the new statutory fair use provision had established a “user
right,” and represented a new balance between authors’ rights and
users’ rights in favor of users.149 On appeal, the Supreme Court
rejected this position outright, explaining that fair use should, rather,
be understood simply as a legal defense.150 In the subsequent case of
Telran Ltd. v Charlton Communications,151 however, the Court
questioned the defense approach taken in Premier League by noting
that fair use is not merely a technical defense to infringement but a
permissible use under the Act. It proceeded to characterize a
permitted use as a “right” that is granted to the user — an approach
that was later reaffirmed by the court in Safecom Ltd. v. Raviv.152
While Israel is rapidly charting its own course in the development of
fair use jurisprudence, it will offer a fascinating case study on the
coalescence of a fair dealing history built on the British 1911 Act, a
statutory move to an open and flexible fair use defense mirroring the
U.S. model, and, at least potentially, a users’ rights approach drawn
from the Canadian example.153
As other nations around the world contemplate making a similar
move from the British imperial fair dealing law to a U.S.-like fair use
defense,154 the language of “user rights” is increasingly invoked.155 In
149. Lital Helman, Session IV: Fair Use and Other Exceptions, 40 COLUM. J.L.
& ARTS 395, 399 (2017).
150. Elkin-Koren, Copyright in a Digital Ecosystem, supra note 80, at 157.
151. CA 9183/11 Telran Commc’ns Ltd. v. Charlton Ltd. (2013) (Isr.); see
Elkin-Koren, Copyright in a Digital Ecosystem, supra note 80, at 157.
152. CA 7996/11 Safecom Ltd. v. Raviv 18 (2013) (Isr.) (accepting the position
adopted in Telran that a permitted use constitutes a right granted to the user).
153. See, e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren & Orit Fischman-Afori, Rulifying Fair Use, 59
ARIZ. L. REV. 161, 180 (2017) (examining the judicial ‘rulification’ of fair use by
the Israeli courts following the enactment of the 2007 Copyright Act). See
generally Zemer, supra note 19, at 263, 267 (evaluating the normative evolution of
copyright in Israel).
154. Copyright Act 1987, § 13(2)(a), amended by Act A1420 2012 (Malay.)
(amending to permit fair dealing for an inclusive and open-ended list of purposes);
An Act Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 8293, Otherwise
Known as the “Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines”, and for Other
Purposes, Rep. Act No. 103721, § 185 (2012) (Phil.); Copyright Act, 2006, § 3536 (Sing.) (incorporating a 2006 amendment with a fair dealing provision allowing
the identification of privileged uses on the basis of multiple factors); [Copyright
Act], Act No. 432, Jan. 28, 1957, amended by Act No. 12137, Dec. 30, 2013, art.
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Australia, for example, where no fewer than six government
inquiries and reviews over the past two decades have recommended
the adoption of fair use,156 the most recent Productivity Commission
Report reiterated the recommendation, explicitly framing it as a
matter of user rights.157 Among the summary of key points appears
the following: “Introducing the principles–based fair use exception
as Australia’s system of user rights, would go some way to redress
the imbalance between copyright holders, consumers and
intermediate users.”158
In South Africa, where intellectual property law reform is an
ongoing project, attention has focused on proposed amendments to
the Copyright Act to create new exceptions for users.159 Reporting
for Intellectual Property Watch on a workshop to discuss the revised
Draft Copyright Amendment Bill of 2015,160 Linda Daniels,
explained: “Expanding such user rights in South Africa in a core
purpose of the revision . . . [including] expanding rights to use
copyrighted works for education, libraries and to provide access for
people with disabilities.”161 Sean Flynn has argued that “South
Africa’s law in many respects fails to provide typical user rights that
exist in other countries,” and hailed the draft bill as presenting a “key
opportunity” to support both the expansion and the exercise of “user
35(3) (S. Kor.) (exempting fair use, among other things, for reporting, criticism,
education, and research); Copyright Act, 2016, § 65 (Taiwan); see JONATHAN
BAND & JONATHAN GERAFI, THE FAIR USE/FAIR DEALING HANDBOOK 1 (2013);
Christophe Geiger, Daniel J. Gervais & Martin Senftleben, Understanding the
“Three-step Test”, in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 167, 187 (Daniel
J. Gervais ed., 2015).
155. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, An International
Acquis: Integrating Regimes and Restoring Balance, in INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 121, 159 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2015).
156. AUSTL. L. REFORM COMMISSION, COPYRIGHT AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY
61-64 (2013).
157. AUSTL. GOV’T PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ARRANGEMENTS: PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION INQUIRY REPORT 165 (2016).
158. Id. at 165.
159. Copyright Amendment Bill No. 646 of 2015 ¶ 14 (S. Afr.) (establishing
general exceptions from the protection of copyright for fair use).
160. Id.
161. Linda Daniels, Panels Present Importance of Fair Use in South Africa’s
Draft Copyright Amendment, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, Jan. 13, 2017,
https://www.ip-watch.org/2017/01/13/panels-present-importance-fair-use-southafricas-draft-copyright-amendment/.
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rights.”162 In addition to new exceptions for particular uses, the draft
bill includes an open-ended (although circumscribed) fair use
exception that borrows in large part from the wording of Section 107
of the U.S. Copyright Act.163 Presently, South Africa remains a fair
dealing jurisdiction,164 but domestic commentators seem increasingly
inclined to advance the position that fair dealing is a right and not
merely a defense.165 Tanya Pistorius, for example, argues that “the
general purpose of copyright exceptions and limitations is to balance
the public’s right to access copyright works and the economic rights
of copyright owners.”166 Her view is endorsed by Van der Walt and
du Bois.167
In Ireland, the Copyright Review Committee Report of 2013168
recommended the adoption of a “specifically Irish version” of fair
162. See Sean Flynn, Copyright Legal and Practical Reform for the South
African Film Industry, 16 AFR. J. INFO. & COMM. 38, 41, 46 (2015); Sean Flynn,
Academic Comments: South African Copyright Amendment Bill, 2015,
INFOJUSTICE (Sept. 17, 2015), http://infojustice.org/archives/35003.
163. South Africa Copyright Act 98 of 1978 (with 2015 Proposed Amendments
in red/strike out) § 12A(2), (4)-(6) (adding Section 12A(2): “(2) Notwithstanding
any provision of this Act, fair use of work for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, judicial proceedings, professional advice, teaching
which may include, making multiple copies for classroom use, scholarship or
research is not an infringement of copyright” (emphasis added). A new subsection
(5) would set out factors for determining fairness, importing the four U.S. factors
for consideration. Additional factors in paragraph 5(d) and subsection 6 could,
however, significantly limit the availability of fair use in certain cases where, e.g.,
the whole work is used, the source or author are not mentioned, or when use is
made for commercial gain. See also 17 U.S.C. § 107.
164. Copyright Act 98 of 1978 § 12 (S. Afr.) (laying out South Africa’s law that
copyright will not be infringed by fair dealing).
165. AJ van der Walt & M. du Bois, The Importance of the Commons in the
Context of Intellectual Property, 24 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 31, 47 (2013).
166. T. Pistorius, Copyright Law, in LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
SOUTH AFRICA 143, 211 (H.B. Klopper et al. eds., 2011).
167. Van der Walt & du Bois, supra note 166, at 47 (describing Pistorius’
position as: “[C]orrespond[ing] exactly with the general purpose of the public
domain in the sense that intellectual property rights should be construed and
developed in such a way that intellectual property works would still be readily
accessible to the public and available for future creative use”); accord Pamela
Andanda, Copyright Law and Online Journalism: A South African Perspective on
Fair Use and Reasonable Media Practice, 6 QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. PROP. 411,
413-14 (2016).
168. COPYRIGHT REVIEW COMMITTEE FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF JOBS,
ENTERPRISE, AND INNOVATION, MODERNISING COPYRIGHT 176-77 (2013).
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use that would be open and flexible but closely tied to existing
exceptions.169 Particularly interesting, for our purposes, was the
proposed definition of “lawful user” to be applied to the specific
context of exceptions under the heading of fair dealing: “In this Part,
“lawful user” means a person who, whether under a license to
undertake any act restricted by the copyright in the work or
otherwise, has a right to use the work, and “lawful use” shall be
construed accordingly.”170 Indeed, the full package of proposed
copyright exceptions and safeguards for lawful users (which did not
ultimately progress into law) was remarkably consistent with a broad
and positive conception of users’ rights to make use of protected
works for permitted purposes.
In India, minor and still restrictive, additions were made to the
statutory fair dealing provisions by the Copyright (Amendment) Act
of 2012.171 But it was arguably the Supreme Court of Canada’s fair
dealing reasons in the Alberta case172 that provided the basis for a
169. The Copyright and Related Rights Act (Act No. 28/2000), §§ 50(4), 221(2)
(Ir.) (proposing to change the phrasing “fair dealing means” to “fair dealing
includes,” thereby creating the flexibility for additional uses to fall within the
ambit of the defense as technologies evolve). See also COPYRIGHT REVIEW
COMMITTEE FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF JOBS, ENTERPRISE, AND INNOVATION, supra
note 168, at 9, 68-69 (explaining that anti-circumvention provisions would
explicitly not prevent permitted acts under the proposed amendments while a
mechanism would allow lawful users to request access, imposing on the copyright
owner a statutory duty to comply); id. at 62 (justifying the addition of an openended fair dealing defence for “for the purposes of caricature, parody, pastiche, or
satire, or for similar purposes”); id. at 63 (recommending the introduction of an
exception for non-commercial user-generated content based on the Canadian
example); id. at 85-86 (explaining a proposed fair dealing exception for “contentmining”); id. at 13 (describing the recommendation that any contract term which
unfairly purports to restrict an exception permitted by the Act should be void).
170. COPYRIGHT REVIEW COMMITTEE FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF JOBS,
ENTERPRISE, AND INNOVATION, supra note 168, at 61 (emphasis added).
171. Copyright (Amendment) Act, No. 27 of 2012, para. 32 (India); see Abhai
Pandey, Inside Views: The Indian Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012 and its
Functioning So Far, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Oct. 23, 2014), https://www.ipwatch.org/2014/10/23/the-indian-copyright-amendment-act-2012-and-itsfunctioning-so-far/.
172. Alberta v. Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency, 2 S.C.R. at 345. See
Petition of the Society for Promoting Educational Access and Knowledge, 5-6,
https://spicyip.com/docs/DU%20Photocopying%20case/Application-forIntervention-SPEAK.pdf (citing the Supreme Court of Canada in support of the
proposition that “copyright exceptions ought to be construed more as ‘rights’ or
‘entitlements’ accruing in favour of users such as educational institutions and not
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game-changing ruling in the Delhi University photocopying case,173
which upheld a broad interpretation of the educational use exception.
The High Court described its interpretation of the provision as “a
right conferred on a person to use the work of another without any
compensation.”174 In an op-ed entitled Why Students Need the Right
to Copy, Shamnad Basheer explained the rights at stake in the
litigation over India’s educational use exception:
These exceptions reflect a clear Parliamentary intention to exempt core
aspects of education from the private sphere of copyright infringement.
Eviscerating these exceptions at the behest of publishers will strike at the
very heart of our constitutional guarantee of a fundamental right to
education for all. In fact, copyright scholars have begun labelling these
exceptions as “rights” accruing in favor of beneficiaries such as students.
In CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, the Supreme
Court of Canada endorsed this sentiment noting that: “ . . . The fair
dealing exception, like other exceptions in the Copyright Act, is a user’s
right . . . it must not be interpreted restrictively.”175

In short, it seems clear that, around the world, as forces mount to
safeguard copyright limits and expand exceptions in the digital age,
they find a foothold in the idea of user rights.
At the level of international lawmaking, admittedly, the language
of copyright “limits and exceptions” (L&E) persists. Cast as such, of
course, L&E can be readily misrepresented as antithetical to the
as ‘limited exceptions.’”); see also Univ. of Oxford v. Rameshwari Photocopy
Servs., (2016) RFA(OS) 81, para. 7-10, 69 (declining to regard the Canadian fair
dealing case as persuasive authority given the specific requirements of the relevant
Indian provision).
173. Rameshwari Photocopy Servs., RFA(OS) 81, para. 75-80 (ruling in favour
of the university and the photocopy service by finding no copyright infringement
in the activities questioned by the publishers in view of the educational use
exception under section 52(1)(i) of the Copyright Act of 1957).
174. Id. para. 76-77 (noting that the education exception was like the “brilliant
beating” drum permitted at times to mute the sounds of other provisions of the Act
for the purposes of the statute’s overall harmony).
175. Shamnad Basheer, Why Students Need the Right to Copy, HINDU (June 13,
2016, 4:48 AM), http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/why-students-need-theright-to-copy/article4654452.ece; see also Lawrence Liang, Exceptions and
Limitations in Indian Copyright Law for Education: An Assessment, 3 LAW &
DEV. REV. 196, 218 (2010) (arguing for greater exceptions and limitations to
address the needs of developing countries in general and with respect to the Indian
constitutional right to education in particular).
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international legal order — undesirable derogations from the
normative quest to harmonize robust intellectual property
protections.176 This perception of L&E as only narrowly permissible
and broadly frowned upon is reinforced by the tenacious Three-Step
Test.177 Originally articulated in the Berne Convention, the ThreeStep Test is now an international constraint on nations’ capacity to
lawfully enact new and flexible copyright exceptions.178 Recent
efforts to reimagine the meaning and application of the Three-Step
Test are important and welcome interventions in the international IP
narrative. The argument can be made that the Three-Step Test,
properly conceived (or radically reconceived, depending on one’s
perspective), should advance the cause of proportionality and
balance within the system.179 What this debate reveals is the
fundamental error of constructing a lopsided international copyright
regime wherein only owners have rights worthy of protection.180
Recent developments suggest that this, too, may be changing.181 The
176. See Liang, supra note 175, at 219-20.
177. Id. at 219 (explaining the Three-Step Test which is a general formula
applied to determine the legality of copyright exceptions and limitations).
178. Berne Convention, supra note 1, at 293 (articulating that permitted
exemptions from copyright infringement must meet a three factor test: “(1) There
is a certain special case or use; (2) that does not conflict with a normal exploitation
of a work; and (3) that does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of
the author.”); see also Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights art. 1, 9, 13, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154; WIPO Copyright
Treaty, supra note 1, art. 10; WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, supra
note 1, art. 16.
179. See MARTIN SENFTLEBEN, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS AND THE THREE-STEP
TEST: AN ANALYSIS OF THE THREE-STEP TEST IN INTERNATIONAL AND EC
COPYRIGHT LAW 295 (2004); Geiger, Gervais & Senftleben, supra note 154, at
189; Christophe Geiger et al., Declaration: A Balanced Interpretation of the
“Three-Step Test” in Copyright Law, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELECTRIC
COM. L. 119, 120-21 (2010); Martin Senftleben, The International Three-Step
Test: A Model Provision for EC Fair Use Legislation, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO.
TECH. & ELECTRIC COM. L. 67, 77-78 (2010).
180. See RUTH L. OKEDIJI, THE INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT SYSTEM:
LIMITATIONS, EXCEPTIONS, AND PUBLIC INTEREST CONSIDERATIONS FOR
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ix (2006) (arguing that “the concept of the public interest
in international intellectual property regulation focused disproportionately on just
one aspect of the public interest, namely securing the optimal provision of
knowledge goods by granting exclusive rights to authors and inventors”).
181. Marrakesh VIP Treaty, supra note 1; Amy Kapczynski, Access to
Knowledge: A Conceptual Genealogy, in ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE OF
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successful coming into force of the Marrakesh Treaty182 as well as,
more broadly, the traction gained by the Access to Knowledge
movement,183 reflect efforts to re-contextualize copyright exceptions
in the realm of rights.184 As WIPO (albeit belatedly and slowly)
responds to the challenge of reorienting the international copyright
system towards development goals,185 international treaty-making
efforts in the realm of “copyright limitations and exceptions”186 are
taking on growing importance. As bilateral, plurilateral, and regional
agreements continue to ratchet up protection for copyright owners
and industries, the need for a positively articulated account of L&Es

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 17, 41-42 (Gaëlle Krikorian & Amy Kapczynski ed.,
2010).
182. Marrakesh VIP Treaty, supra note 1.
183. See SARAH BANNERMAN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT & ACCESS TO
KNOWLEDGE 120-22 (2016); Kapczynski, supra note 181, at 41-42.
184. See, e.g., Farida Shaheed (Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural
Rights), Copyright Policy and the Right to Science and Culture, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/28/57, para. 94 (Dec. 24, 2014) (recognizing the significance of copyright
limitations and exceptions and the fundamental human right of access to science
and culture); Tim Wilson (Human Rights Commissioner), Senate Inquiry into the
Copyright Amendment (Online Infringement) Bill 2015, AUSTRALIAN HUM. RTS.
COMMISSION (Apr. 15, 2015) (warning that, in the absence of an adequate fair use
defense, respecting copyright can unreasonably restrict the right to freedom of
expression); Geiger et al., supra note 179, at 121 (declaring that the Three-StepTest, which restricts states’ enactment of copyright, should be interpreted in a
manner that respects the interests deriving from human rights and fundamental
freedoms); Kevin Smith, Copyright, Open Access and Human Rights, SCHOLARLY
COMMUNICATIONS
@
DUKE
(Mar.
13,
2015),
http://blogs.library.duke.edu/scholcomm/2015/03/13/copyright-open-access-andhuman-rights (“[I]ntellectual property laws are in tension with the fundamental
human right of access to science and culture.”).
185. See Boyle, supra note 2, at 3-6 (calling for national and international
intellectual property laws that promote the balance between rights and the public
domain).
186. World Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO], Limitations and Exceptions,
http://www.wipo.int/copyright/en/limitations (last visited Jul. 9, 2017) (Due to the
development of new technologies and the ever-increasing worldwide use of the
Internet, it has been considered that the . . . balance between various stakeholders’
interests needs to be recalibrated. Limitations and exceptions is an issue considered
in the agenda of the WIPO Standing Committee for Copyright and Related Rights
(SCCR) and, recently, its debate has been focused mainly on three groups of
beneficiaries or activities in relation to exceptions and limitations – on educational
activities, on libraries and archives and on disabled persons, particularly visually
impaired persons.).
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also takes on growing urgency.187 Our understanding and
presentation of the nature and role of such “exceptions” is therefore
becoming a critical point of departure for the future of the
international copyright regime.188
Tawfik argues that the full implications of the Supreme Court of
Canada’s endorsement of user rights should extend well beyond the
Canadian context:
The principles articulated by the Court should also resonate among all
who are concerned that copyright policy at the international level has
resulted in a continuous strengthening of the copyright owner’s interest to
the exclusion of other public policy objectives including access to
information and the preservation of a flourishing public domain.189

187. See Matthew Rimmer, Back to the Future: The Digital Millennium
Copyright Act and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, LAWS (forthcoming 2017); Peter
Yu, The RCEP and Trans-Pacific Intellectual Property Norms, 50 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 2-3) (noting the importance of
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (RCEP), currently being negotiated among Australia, China, India,
Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and the ten members of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations, to regional trade and investment agreements); Timothy
Vollmer, Dozens of organizations call on European Parliament to redouble efforts
for progressive copyright changes, CREATIVE COMMONS (June 2, 2017),
https://creativecommons.org/2017/06/02/dozens-organizations-call-europeanparliament-redouble-efforts-progressive-copyright-changes (outlining the concerns
raised by Creative Commons and sixty organizations in an open letter to European
lawmakers, calling on “Parliament and Council to spearhead crucial changes that
promote creativity and business opportunities, enable research and education, and
protect user rights in the digital market”).
188. See Margot E. Kaminski & Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, The Marrakesh Treaty
for Visually Impaired Persons: Why a Treaty was Preferable to Soft Law, 75 U.
PITT. L. REV. 255, 280-82 (2014) (describing the relationship between the “hard
law” treaty approach taken by WIPO and the recognition of “users rights”); see
also Aaron Scheinwald, Note, Who Could Possibly be Against a Treaty for the
Blind?, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 455, 487-90 (2012) (“The
weight of the ‘gateway drug’ argument is grounded in the fear that the proposed
treaty is the ‘thin edge of the wedge’ to the users’ rights movement.”). Cf. Silke
von Lewinski, WIPO’s Discussions on Exceptions and Limitations, in Particular in
Favour of Visually Impaired Persons, 225 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT
D’AUTEUR 53, 163-65 (2010) (opposing the solution of a binding international
treaty and suggesting that solutions instead be found at a national level).
189. Myra J. Tawfik, International Copyright Law and ‘Fair Dealing’ as a
“User Right”, UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC, AND CULTURAL
ORGANIZATION (UNESCO) E-COPYRIGHT BULLET., Apr.-June 2005, at 6-7
[hereinafter Tawfik, International Copyright Law and ‘Fair Dealing’].
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Based on the Canadian experience, it might reasonably be
concluded that advocates for expanding and entrenching copyright
limitations and exceptions internationally would do well to line up
behind the concept of “user rights.”190 This could be true on a
jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis, but also at the international level,
where a commitment to user rights as such could both validate and
mandate national domestic efforts to recalibrate copyright’s balance
to the benefit of users and the public.191 Currently, such efforts must
withstand accusations that they contravene the Three-Step Test and
international obligations, while the steady expansion of owner rights
meets no such barrier in our international copyright regime.192 As
such, as Margaret-Ann Wilkinson observes, “even for Canadians . . .
in light of the international developments involving copyright
holders’ rights it seems very important to ensure that the rights of
users are clearly internationally enshrined as well.”193 The concern is
that, without some formal textual instantiation of user rights in the
international regime, future governments in pursuit of external traderelated goals may be pressured to derogate from established domestic
protections for users.194 The international recognition of “users
rights,” it seems reasonable to assert, might provide a more reliable
shield for users against the incursion of copyright.195
The discussion that follows does not seek to dispute or undermine
the significance of developments in the Canadian copyright law
around the judicial and broad endorsement of “user rights,” nor does
it advocate against the assertion of user rights internationally. Indeed,
it takes as its premise that there is a pressing need to develop global
copyright norms around copyright limits and exceptions—norms that
190. Id. at 14-15.
191. See id. at 7-8.
192. See Myra Tawfik, International Copyright Law: W[h]ither User Rights?, in
IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW 66, 77-78
(Geist ed., 2005) (“[T]he three-step test does not undermine the discretion enjoyed
by national legislatures to enact limitations and exceptions so long as they remain
consistent with the Berne Convention and conform to the objectives the test was
formulated to achieve.”).
193. Wilkinson, supra note 16, at 10.
194. See id. (noting that, if user rights are not so enshrined, “future Canadian
governments [may] be pressured by future international trade possibilities to use
legislative power to derogate from the level of users’ rights protection that is
currently in place in Canadian law”).
195. See id. at 10, 13.
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can be “effectively translated into a credible system that
appropriately values author and users rights.”196 However, In what
follows, I will caution against the attractive assumption that “rights”
are all users need in order to cure the ills of an over-expansive
copyright system. Rights can only do so much; and in some respects,
I will suggest, blind reliance upon the rhetoric of rights could do
more harm than good to the overarching cause of advancing the
public interest and protecting the public domain.

III. THE ROLE AND RISKS OF USERS’ RIGHTS
As we have seen, the ruling of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Théberge197 produced a shift away from the owner-centric approach
to copyright that had characterized Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence. It
did not, however, produce a departure from rights-based reasoning.198
The Théberge decision acknowledged the role of the public in
copyright policy, but nevertheless invoked natural rights-based
language to explain the nature of the “balance” sought “[A] balance
between promoting the public interest in the encouragement and
dissemination of works of the arts and intellect and obtaining a just
reward for the creator (or more accurately, to prevent someone other
than the creator from appropriating whatever benefits may be
generated).”199
The balance requires that we first “recogniz[e] the creator’s
rights.”200 It should be no surprise, then, that the Théberge balance
196. P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ & RUTH L. OKEDIJI, CONCEIVING AN
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT 50
(2008),
https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/limitations_exceptions_
copyright.pdf.
197. Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain Inc., [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336,
361-63 (Can.) (rejecting the argument that the ink-transfer process constituted an
infringement of a copyright owner’s economic rights because there was no
“reproduction without multiplication” of the total number of copies).
198. Id. at 337-38.
199. Id. at 355.
200. Id. (“The proper balance . . . lies not only in recognizing the creator’s
rights but in giving due weight to their limited nature.”) (emphasis added); see
CCH Canadian v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, paras. 10,
23 (Can.) (quoting Théberge, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336, paras. 30-31) (asserting that one
objective of the Copyright Act is to obtain “a just reward for the creator”). From a
Lockean perspective, the concept of a “just reward” would amount to a “right,” and
generally, it is likely to be understood in this way. The language of “just reward” is
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has since been explained in distinctly Lockean language: “The
person who sows must be allowed to reap what is sown, but the
harvest must ensure that society is not denied some benefit from the
crops.”201 Courts purporting to implement the Théberge copyright
balance can still be guided by a conviction that “to deprive authors of
the fruits of their labour is unjust.”202 There is, in other words,
nothing inherent in the idea of a balanced copyright system or a
public interest purpose that necessarily disrupts the rights-based
rationale for copyright ownership.
Rather than an instrument of broader social good, the copyright
system remains tethered, in this account, to authorial claims of right,
necessarily limiting the power of the public interest to define and
delimit the copyright owner’s claim.203 Individual rights are not
subject to—and so will not cede to—the interests of the public at
therefore likely to permit the continued prevalence of a Lockean approach to
copyright.
201. CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Canada, [2002] CAF 187, para.
23 (Can.); see Teresa Scassa, Interests in the Balance, in IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST:
THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW 41, 44 (Geist ed., 2005) (citing CCH
Canadian Ltd., para. 23) (describing the use of this Lockean approach as “an
awkward amalgamation” of utilitarian and natural rights models).
202. Robertson v. Thomson Corp., 2004 CarswellOnt 4015, para. 51 (Can. Ont.
C.A.) (WL).
203. See Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 507 (2d Cir. 1991) (guarding against
“spurious claims by those who might otherwise try to share the fruits of the efforts
of a sole author”) (emphasis added); Harper & Row, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S.
539, 546 (1985) (“The rights conferred by copyright are designed to assure
contributors to the store of knowledge a fair return for their labors.”) (emphasis
added); Triangle Publ’n v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 626 F.2d 1171, 1174 (5th
Cir. 1980) (describing fair use as a balance between “the author’s right to
compensation for his work” and the “public’s interest in the widest possible
dissemination of ideas and information”); Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall St.
Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 1977) (displaying concern for protecting
the creator’s “substantial investment of time, money and labor”); Mazer v. Stein,
347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities
deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered”) (emphasis added);
Int’l News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236-40 (1918) (declaring
that when two parties seek to profit in the same field using the same material, that
material is “quasi property” attempting to “reap where it has not sown” constitutes
“appropriating to itself the harvest of those who have sown”); Wheaton v. Peters,
33 U.S. 591, 669-70 (1834) (Thompson, J., dissenting) (“The great principle on
which the author’s rights rests, is, that it is the fruit or production of his own
labour, and which may, by the labour of the faculties of the mind, establish a right
of property.”).
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large.204 But they may be limited by the competing rights of others.205
Herein lies the power and the appeal of “user rights”: the concept of
the user’s right has provided much needed ballast for users in the
balancing act that courts are now asked to perform.206

A. THE PROBLEM WITH THE COPYRIGHT BALANCE
The label of right, as we have seen, proves useful in ensuring that
the interests of users are not simply set aside in the face of the
owner’s claim.207 Rather, with the label of right appended, the
interests of the user are sufficiently weighted on the proverbial
copyright scale to effectively limit the rights of authors.208 There are
risks, however, that come with subscribing to this notional balancing
of creator and user rights. As Laura Murray has argued, “the
metaphor of balance has its limits because it posits users and creators
as distinct entities placed on either side of a fulcrum.”209 Thus
conceptualized, users and creators have opposing interests at play in
what is essentially a zero-sum game: what is good for the creator
(more protection) is bad for the user (less freedom to use); and what
is good for the user (freedom to use) is bad for the creator (less
protection).210
The flaw in this vision is twofold. First, creators and users occupy
separate categories while in fact, of course, all creators are users, and
all users are creators.211 Second, the rights of individuals in each
204. See Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 669-70 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (arguing that
authors have a claim of right “founded upon the soundest principles of justice,
equity and public policy).
205. CCH Canadian Ltd., [2002] CAF 187, paras. 12-13 (users’ rights).
206. Id.
207. See Laura J. Murray, Protecting Ourselves to Death: Canada, Copyright
and the Internet, 9 FIRST MONDAY, No.10, Oct. 4, 2004, at 8,
http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1179/1099
[hereinafter
Murray, Protecting Ourselves to Death] (describing copyright as a system
comprised of many individual rights-holders whose interests are served).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 9.
210. See id. at 8-9 (stressing the need for balance in copyright law).
211. Cf. Julie Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L.
REV. 347, 348 (2005) (offering a situated and contextual account of the various
roles of the user in the copyright context by stating, “I do not intend to argue that
copyright is, as some have asserted, ‘a law of users’ rights.’ I am happy to agree
that copyright is first and foremost a law of authors’ rights, and that having some
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category are presumed to be at odds with one another, while the
operative assumption justifying copyright is that the interests of
creators and users should align in the encouragement and
dissemination of works.212 The complexity of the stakeholder
interests necessarily at play in the copyright system (the diverse
interests of authors, owners, users, and the wider public) may be
helpfully simplified by the binary scales on which they are forced to
compete, but they are also flattened to the point of fiction.213 To
make invisible the complex relationships implicated by the processes
of creative cultural exchange is to remove the dimension in which we
can perceive what is truly at stake.214 Shared and divergent values,
competing and complimentary interests, shifting roles and
relationships—these are all reduced to commensurate weights to be
traded off against one another.
The problem is not unique to copyright, but rather is inherent to
the over-simplifying and complexity-concealing notion of balance
that is increasingly prevalent in our liberal legal imagination. Julian
Sanchez puts his finger on the problem:
Perhaps the most obvious problem with balancing metaphors is that they
suggest a relationship that is always, by necessity, zero sum: If one side
rises, the other must fall in exact proportion . . .
In my own area of study, the familiar trope of ‘balancing privacy and
security’ is a source of constant frustration to privacy advocates, because
while there are clearly sometimes tradeoffs between the two, it often
seems that the zero-sum rhetoric of ‘balancing’ leads people to view them
as always in conflict.215

As Kim Weatherall has noted, the “subtle influence of framing”216
such law is, in general, a good idea. That statement, however, doesn’t end the
discussion; it begins it. A theory of authors’ rights must be informed by a theory of
the user as well.”).
212. See generally Julien Sanchez, The Trouble with “Balance” Metaphors,
JULIAN SANCHEZ (Feb. 4, 2011), http://www.juliansanchez.com/2011/02/04/thetrouble-with-balance-metaphors/ (discussing the effect of using the “zero-sum
rhetoric of balancing” on people’s perception of the relationship between the two
values being ‘balanced’).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Kimberlee Weatherall (@kim_Weatherall), TWITTER (Feb. 12, 2016, 6:35

46

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[33:1

such policy questions as balancing acts is just as powerful—and, it is
implied, just as unsatisfactory—in the copyright domain.217 The
presentation of users’ rights as inherently in conflict with creators’
rights reinforces a fundamentally flawed understanding of the latter:
the zero-sum balancing act suggests that the rights of copyright
owners exist in spite of, and in constant tension with, the rights of
those who would use their works.218 Within this frame, it becomes
impossible to see the rights of creators as existing through the
public’s interest in the work rather than against it. In turn, then, the
frame brings into sharp relief the creators’ rights as individual
entitlements—ends in themselves—independent of the rights of users
or the interests of the public at large.219 This is not a baseline
assumption compatible with strong users’ rights, broad fair dealing,
or an expansive public domain.
In addition to creating the unhelpful illusion of an inevitable tradeoff between creators and users as distinct entities, the metaphor of
balancing rights serves to conceal the inadequacy of our analytic
reasoning. Sanchez’ critique is also apt in this regard:
[O]ften the imaginary scales conjured by balancing talk conceal the fact
that we don’t have a clear sense of what [the] shared dimension is
supposed to be, what single quantity is supposed to serve as our standard
for comparing such heterogeneous goods . . .
This may be why so many legal opinions employing ‘balancing tests’ feel
so thin, and so many arguments about where to ‘strike the right balance’
between competing values founder. The metaphor assumes a lot of
analytic background work that hasn’t actually been done—and conceals
the fact that it still needs to be.220

The balance metaphor in the copyright domain masks the reality
that we have no agreed upon “shared dimension”—no uniform
measure against which to weigh the heterogeneous interests and
incommensurable considerations that we are haphazardly tossing
PM), https://twitter.com/kim_weatherall/status/698334636368236544.
217. Id.
218. Sanchez, supra note 212.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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onto the copyright scale.221 Balancing analyses are necessarily based
on value judgments about the relative importance of rights and
interests.222 Whether a balance can be said to be have been struck
depends only on the relative weight that the decision-maker
attributes to the interests that she puts in the balance; as such, the
balancing exercise can be no more than a subjective evaluation of
who and what should prevail.223 Without the masking metaphor, this
much would at least be clear. So too would be the shortcomings of
our “analytic background work”: what are the multiple diverse and
overlapping values captured within the monolithic idea of the
author’s right or the public interest? What is the single standard
against which we should measure the competing rights and interests
of authors and users, owners, and the public (progress, utility, justice,
equality, democracy, self-fulfillment, agency, cultural creativity, the
social good)? Recourse to the self-rationalizing rhetoric of balance
simply side-steps the analytical inquiry essential to purpose-oriented
lawmaking.
Notwithstanding the flaws inherent in the metaphor of balance, it
is nothing short of ubiquitous in today’s liberal legal order.224 With
so many stakeholder claims at play in the copyright context,
resistance to the frame of balance may be futile.225 Indeed, if the
alternative to a “balanced” regime is one aimed only or primarily at
the protection of copyright owners, resisting the balancing rhetoric
would also be self-defeating for anyone hoping to advance the
interests of users and the public.226 If we are prepared to embrace the
metaphor of balance on such logic—and assuming that authors’
“rights” are already and will remain on the metaphorical scale—it
seems reasonable to conclude that users will be better off with
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Iddo Porat, From Interest-Based Balancing to Rights-Based Balancing:
Two Models of Balancing in the Early Days of American Constitutional Balancing,
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK (SSRN), at 42 (Sept. 13, 2007),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1012592.
225. See id. (asserting that balancing tests “have become inseparable from, and a
leading characteristic of, the global post-WWII phenomenon of a rights culture and
of constitutionalism”).
226. Cf. id. at 41-42 (providing examples of individuals leading the balancing
effort internationally).
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“rights” on the scale than mere “interests.” As Frederick Schauer
reminds us with regard to the balancing of rights and interests:
“When rights are on one side of the equation, there is a presumption
in favour of the right[.]”227 Rights, in other words, have “a thumb on
the scale” in their favor. 228
There are, however, a few more cautionary notes to sound about
the conceptual move from a rights-interests balance to a rights-rights
balance in the copyright context.

B. THE PROBLEM WITH USERS’ RIGHTS AS BALLAST IN THE
BALANCE
Relying on user rights as ballast on the public side of the copyright
balance could potentially overwhelm—and perhaps ultimately
displace—the weight of the public interest as such. While the public
interest was a critical consideration in the Supreme Court of
Canada’s CCH ruling and featured prominently in the Court’s
articulation of copyright’s balance, the recognition of user rights has
potentially precipitated a move towards rights-based balancing in
copyright law.229
Iddo Porat explains the shift from interest-based to rights-based
balancing, in connection with American constitutional jurisprudence,
as the move from “early balancing,” which was progressive and antiformalist, to “modern balancing” wherein rights are preferred over

227. Frederick Schauer, Proportionality and the Question of Weight, in
PROPORTIONALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW: RIGHTS, JUSTIFICATION, REASONING
173, 178 (Grant Huscroft, Bradley W. Miller & Grégoire Webber eds., 2014).
Indeed, others may suggest that the mere non-rights-based interests cannot override
or delimit the right at all. For further discussion of this important question, see
generally Alan Gewirth, Are There Any Absolute Rights?, 31 PHIL. Q. 1, 2 (1981)
(comparing the ideas of absolute rights and overrideable rights) and Judith Jarvis
Thomson, Some Ruminations on Rights, 19 ARIZ. L. REV. 45, 51-52 (1977)
(introducing the idea that rights are stringent in many cases and may be
“overrideable”).
228. Porat, supra note 224, at 43.
229. CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Canada, [2002] CAF 187,
paras. 23-24, 48, 70 (Can.) (describing the copyright balance in terms that
reference the “public interest,” “society’s interest” and “users’ interests,” but
injecting the user’s “right” into the balance to boost “user’s interests” when
addressing the scope and availability of fair dealing as a defence).
230. Porat, supra note 224, at 4-27.
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policy.230 Oliver Wendell Holmes, for example, is identified as one of
the leaders of the early balancing methodology in American
jurisprudence. He resisted the idea of judges logically deducing
answers from conceptions of absolute right in favor of recognizing
judges’ duty to “[weigh] considerations of social advantage.”231 In
Hudson Country Water Co. v. McCarter, Justice Holmes wrote: “All
rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical extreme.
Yet all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of principles of policy
which are other than those on which the particular right is
founded[.]”232 Property rights, in this case, were to be balanced
against conflicting interests.233 Porat argues that balancing in this
sense was a reaction against the pro-rights traits of Classicist
constitutional jurisprudence, “lowering absolute rights to the status
of balanceable interests” and “rejecting a right-based or natural
rights-based, automatic preference for the right over the interest.”234
The constitutional Classicists had, in Roscoe Pound’s words, relied
on “an individualist conception of justice, which exaggerate[d] the
importance of property and of contract [and] exaggerate[d] private
right at the expense of public right.”235 Early balancing tests thus
resisted the formalism of this strong rights jurisprudence, employing
interest-based balancing to assess the relative worth and importance
of competing social interests rather than privileging the individual
interests masquerading behind the claim of right.236
Porat proceeds to explain how, with the rise of civil and political
rights, the Progressive movement famously split over the position of
rights, and therefore over the nature of judicial balancing.237 A new
type of “modern balancing” arose, consistent with the pro-rights
rhetoric and adapted to be rights-based; it “gave rights a preferred
position in the balancing process.”238 Porat charts the rise and fall of
230. Porat, supra note 224, at 4-27.
231. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL
PAPERS 167, 183-84 (1920).
232. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908).
233. Id. at 355-57.
234. Porat, supra note 224, at 16.
235. Id. at 15 (citing MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 33, 34 (1992)).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 16.
238. Id. at 30-31.
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the modern balancing approach in tandem with shifting values
around judicial activism, but notes that balancing rhetoric is once
again on the rise in US constitutional law: “The boundaries between
the two types of balancing may have been blurred somewhat, but one
can still identify today balancing that comes hand in hand with
policy-oriented and interest-based argumentation, and balancing that
comes hand in hand with a strong rhetoric of rights.”239
In the copyright context, my first concern with the insertion of
“users’ rights” onto the metaphorical balancing scales is the
possibility that, rather than disrupting the notion of the author’s right
and using balancing to reveal the interest-based nature of authors’
rights claims, the copyright balance will come to look more like a
rights-based balance in which formal rights compete on a scale that
purports to weigh them objectively and prioritize them accordingly.
The risk is that we lose our sense of the balancing mechanism as “a
tool for maximizing social interests, and for demystifying a
heightened rights rhetoric, which is . . . a cover-up for moral and
political predispositions.”240 With the shift to rights-based balancing,
the real disruptive capacity of a policy-oriented copyright balance
could be significantly weakened.
With respect to the balancing metaphor as such, Porat identifies a
further conceptual tension at play in the deployment of balance,
which seems closely tied to whether it is interest-based or rightsbased, pragmatist or formalist in nature.241 The balance itself may be
defined differently depending on how the balancing act is conceived:
if the weighing scales metaphor simply suggests an exercise in
comparing relative values, the act of balancing looks like an intuitive
and subjective process of evaluation and comparison; if the scale
metaphor alludes to finding the actual weight of two or more objects,
then the act of balancing appears more like a purportedly exact,
scientific and objective exercise in measurement.242 Paul Kahn
explains: “The metaphor [of balancing] is ambiguous. It describes
both a process of measuring competing interests to determine which
239. Id. at 40.
240. Porat, supra note 224 at 40-41.
241. Id. at 8-9 (exploring a concept of balancing that “raises the issue of the
relationship between balancing and anti-formalism”).
242. Id. at 8-9.

2017]

GLOBALIZING USER RIGHTS-TALK

51

is ‘weightier’ and a particular substantive outcome characterized as a
‘balance’ of competing interests.”243 If rights have an ostensibly
objective measure, and the weightier right will win, the rights-based
balance ceases to look like a judicial exercise in the evaluation and
comparison of possible outcomes and more like a formalistic
determination of the objective value of competing rights.244 In the
copyright context, the latter approach is more likely to produce an
assessment of the relative importance of protecting owners’ rights
over users’ rights, rather than permitting a careful comparison of the
social and economic advantages or disadvantages of privileging one
party’s interests over the other in a particular context.
Finally, it should be noted that with the addition of users’ rights
onto the copyright’s metaphorical scale, there is a risk that the
individualized owner-versus-user balance subsumes (or even
supplants) the author-versus-public balance.245 The individualization
of interests accompanies the more formalist rights-rhetoric, with the
possible result that broader community-based interests will come to
weigh less or even to be knocked off the scale. With the shift from
interest-based to rights-based balancing there occurs a shift from
community-oriented to individual-oriented analysis—and with this
shift, the public purposes of the copyright system are at risk of
receding from view.246
Laura Murray implicitly captures this concern and more when she
worries about supplanting the concept of “fair dealing” with the idea
of a “user right:”
[T]he Supreme Court elevated fair dealing to the status of a ‘user’s right.’
And yet, is not ‘user’s right’ a less capacious and more constraining
category than ‘fair dealing’? ‘User’ puts the action in a combative light
(user vs. creator/owner), and ‘right’ contains us within an individual
rights discourse. Dealing . . . is relational and process based; use seems
terminal and finite and individual. Fairness is a discourse of practice; right
is a discourse of law. . . . [A]s a term [fair dealing] is more alive in our

243. Id. at 9 n.37 (citing Paul W. Kahn, The Court, the Community and the
Judicial Balance: The Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, 97 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1987)).
244. Id.
245. Laura Murray, Deal with It, in DYNAMIC FAIR DEALING: CREATING
CANADIAN CULTURE ONLINE 349, 350-53 (Rosemary J. Coombe et al. eds., 2014).
246. Id. at 349-51.
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culture than user’s rights are.247

From the perspective of the copyright minimalist, keen to restrain
copyright and to ensure a broad scope for fair and lawful uses of
copyright protected works, it makes perfect sense that the rise of user
rights in the Canadian case law should look like a cause for
celebration. Certainly, the rulings of the Supreme Court of Canada
have solidified the notion that users and the public have rights in
relation to intellectual works.248 Moreover, that notion has since been
employed to good effect in rulings that have typically safeguarded a
reasonably large and liberal fair dealing defense and engaged in a
careful, comparative balancing exercise to keep copyright claims in
check.249 Indeed, it is important to note that the Supreme Court of
Canada’s articulation of the user right kept the broader public interest
very much in view, casting user rights as one means by which to
further copyright’s public interest ends.250
There are, however, reasons to be cautious about the rise of users’
rights rhetoric even for those who applaud these developments in
favor of users. We should be wary of the framing analysis that asks
us to balance owners’ rights against users’ rights because, to
summarize, the balancing metaphor risks: wrongly separating
creators and owners from users and the public, when in fact the same
247. Id. at 351.
248. Michael Geist, Copyright Users’ Rights in Canada Hits Ten: The Tenth
Anniversary
of
the
CCH
Decision,
http://canliiconnects.org/en/
commentaries/27511 (last visited Sept. 19. 2017).
249. Id. See also supra Section II. C. (describing cases in Canada that have
endorsed the language of “user rights”). But see United Airlines, Inc. v.
Cooperstock, 2017 FC 616, para. 111 (acknowledging the “importance of balance
between the rights of creators or authors and those of users” but going on to reject
a fair dealing defence for a critical parody); Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency
v. York University, 2017 FC 669, para. 251 (stating that ‘fair dealing’ is a positive
user right,” but going on to find that the University’s Fair Dealing Guidelines did
not satisfy the requirements of fair dealing for the purposes of education, research
or private study).
250. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Bell
Canada, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 326, paras. 9-11 (Can.) (“Théberge reflected a move away
from an earlier, author-centric view which focused on the exclusive right of
authors and copyright owners to control how their works were used in the
marketplace . . . [It] focused attention instead on the importance copyright plays in
promoting the public interest . . . CCH confirmed that users’ rights are an essential
part of furthering the public interest objectives of the Copyright Act.”).
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people (all of us) occupy these various roles; establishing a zero-sum
equation whereby a gain on one side wrongly appears to be a loss on
the other, with the political consequences that follow; reinforcing a
more formalist, rights-based understanding of the copyright system
that displaces an interest-based evaluation of competing claims; and
reducing shared community goals and public interests into
individualized claims of right, thereby threatening to obscure the
very social values and interests that justify the copyright system.251
And so, at this critical juncture in the development of copyright law,
as we struggle with the extension and enforcement of copyright law
in new technological contexts at a global scale, it may be wise to ask
ourselves whether “users’ rights” hold the key to restraining
copyright—or if our reliance on users’ rights will only, ultimately,
strengthen copyright’s overreaching grasp. A handful of small
victories and some carefully circumscribed concessions for rightsbearing users could come at the cost of reinforcing a rights-based
copyright regime, shifting the recognized purpose of the copyright
system towards the protection of individual rights rather than the
encouragement of authorship for the benefit of society as a whole. If
rights-based reasoning has always, thus far, justified the incessant
expansion of copyright’s domain, might we, in our eagerness to stand
behind the user’s right, unwittingly be inviting more of the same?

IV. BEYOND COPYRIGHT: WHAT’S WRONG WITH
RIGHTS?
As I have suggested, the conceptual and strategic risks associated
with the escalation of rights rhetoric in copyright law are not alien to
other fields of law, from privacy to contract to constitutional theory.
The concerns I have sketched above resonate with longstanding
debate in legal and political theory around the way that “rights” have
been deployed in our liberal legal order, and to whose advantage.
While the legal history and scholarship here is vast, my purpose in
this section is only to outline some core objections to the rise of
rights most closely associated with the school of Critical Legal
Studies.252 We will then briefly consider how these rights critiques
have been both acknowledged and refuted in the feminist and critical
251. Murray, Protecting Ourselves to Death, supra note 207.
252. See infra Section III.A.
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race schools of thought, wherein activists and theorists faced a
familiar dilemma: how to leverage rights claims to advance equality
without succumbing to the totalizing logic of liberal rights and its
flaws.253

A. THE RIGHTS CRITIQUE: REIFICATION AND RHETORIC
The rise of the anti-formalist interest-balancing approach
described above was attributed in large part to Oliver Wendell
Holmes, who was, of course, a leading voice in the American Legal
Realist movement.254 The Realists sought to reveal the fallacy of
judicial rule-bound formalism, insisting instead that every case
involving conflicting claims of right could be resolved only by
making a political and moral choice about which claim to
privilege.255 Simply put, all law is policy.256 Rights were a central
target of the realist critique: “There will be a right if, and only if, the
court finds for the plaintiff or declares the statute unconstitutional.
What the court cites as the reason for the decision—the existence of
a right—is, in fact, only the result.”257
Fast-forward to the last quarter of the twentieth century, and the
Realist torch was carried forth by Critical Legal Scholars under the
banner of Critical Legal Studies (CLS).258 The critique of liberalism
253. See infra Section III.B.
254. See, e.g., Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457
(1897) (stating, “I think that the judges themselves have failed adequately to
recognize their duty of weighing considerations of social advantage”).
255. Friedrich Kessler, Theoretic Bases of Law, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 98, 109
(1941).
256. See, e.g., Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 820 (1935); J. Stuart Russell, The Critical
Legal Studies Challenge to Contemporary Mainstream Legal Philosophy, 18
OTTAWA L. REV. 1, 6 n. 26 (1986).
257. Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 1, 33 (David Kairys ed., 1998).
258. See generally Alan Hunt, The Theory of Critical Legal Studies, 6 OXFORD
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 43-45 (1986) (stating “the emergence of critical legal studies is
the most important intellectual development in the field of legal studies since the
rise of Realism” and noting that CLS scholars diverged on the extent to which they
perceived their projects as building on the Realists’ legacy); see also Allan C.
Hutchinson & Patrick J. Monahan, Law Politics, and the Critical Legal Scholars:
The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 199, 199
(1984) (describing the movement as “a full-frontal assault on the edifice of modern
jurisprudence”); Russell, supra note 256, at 1 (describing CLS as having
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was one of the unifying standpoints of CLS, and core to this was the
contention that liberalism’s claim “to resolve the persistent and
systematic conflict between individual and social interests through
the mechanism of objective rules . . . [and] procedural justice is
inherently flawed.”259 Ultimately, they suggested that the law’s
mediation between conflicting interests can offer only a pragmatic
response to social conflict, producing “a set of results which reflects
the unequal distribution of power and resources whilst claiming to
act in the name of a set of universal social values.”260
Like the Realists before them, the CLS scholars took a radical
political stance aimed at delegitimizing liberal legal theory by
exposing the “received ideals” and presuppositions that informed
judicial decision-making.261 Central to this assault on deductive legal
logic was the critique of rights.262 Duncan Kennedy, a leading
proponent of the so-called Frankfurt school, presents the critique by
providing an account of the role of rights in American legal
consciousness, how one might come to “lose faith in the coherence
of rights discourse,” and why one might critique rights in spite of the
“unpleasantness” of doing so.263 The critique is far richer and more
compelling than I can do justice to here,264 but for our purposes I
“unleashed the most profound challenge to contemporary mainstream Western
legal philosophy since Legal Realism swept the United States”).
259. Hunt, supra note 258, at 5.
260. Id.
261. Russell, supra note 256, at 7.
262. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal
Studies, in LEFT LEGALISM / LEFT CRITIQUE 178, 178 (Wendy Brown & Janet
Halley eds., 2002); Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and
the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1563, 1581 (1984); Frances
Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REV.
387, 390 (1984); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1363
(1984); Mark Tushnet, The Critique of Rights, 47 SMU L. REV. 23 (1993); see
generally, The Critique of Rights, BRIDGE: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON RIGHTS,
https://cyber.harvard.edu/bridge/CriticalTheory/rights.htm (last visited Jul. 16,
2017).
263. Kennedy, supra note 262, at 178-79.
264. Robin L. West, Tragic Rights: The Rights Critique in the Age of Obama, 53
WM & MARY L. REV. 713, 715 (2011) (describing the critique as “one of the most
vibrant, important, counterintuitive, challenging set of ideas that emerged from the
legal academy over the course of the last quarter of the twentieth century”), quoted
in Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE
L.J. 2176, 2187 (2012).
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mean to pull out a few insights that may move the analysis along.
Kennedy describes how, against the background of a nostalgic
reinterpretation of the triumphant 1960s, the liberal left embraced
rights and rights-rhetoric, while the CLS critique of rights appeared
politically perverse.265 Rights came to play the powerful role, in
political discourse, of mediating between factual (objective,
scientific) judgments and value judgments (subjective preferences):
[Rights-based political discourse] presuppose[s] a basic distinction
between rights argument and other kinds of normative argument. The
point of an appeal to a right, the reason for making it, is that it can’t be
reduced to a mere ‘value judgment’ that one outcome is better than
another . . . Rights reasoning, in short, allows you to be right about your
value judgments, rather than just stating ‘preferences.’266

This role for rights depends on the idea, first, that rights are
‘universal’ insofar as they derive from needs, values or preferences
that everyone shares or ought to share; and second, that they are
‘factoid’ in the sense that they exist as entities in legal reasoning- the
recognition of which leads ineluctably to particular rules or
conclusions.267 Together, these attributes permit rights to mediate
between the interests of particular groups in society and the interests
of the whole, Kennedy explains:
When groups are in the process of formation, coming to see themselves as
having something in common that is a positive rather than a negative
identity, the language of rights provides a flexible vehicle for formulating
interests and demands . . . New groups can enter the discourse of
American politics with the expectation that they will at least be
understood, if they can fit themselves to this template.268

The effect is that rights mediate not only between facts and values,
but also between law and politics.269 Legal rules that recognize
accepted rights appear non-partisan, transcending the left-right
divide.270 The result is an “empowerment effect”271 sought and
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

Kennedy, supra note 262, at 182.
Id. at 184-85.
Id. at 185.
Id. at 188.
Id. at 190.
Id. at 189.
Kennedy, supra note 262, at 189.
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embraced by both the left and the right, allowing both camps to
claim “correctness” and rationality in their legal arguments. Rights
talk, as a discourse, invokes a set of presuppositions about law, legal
reasoning and reality (objective truth) upon which those who use it
can now rely.
The role played by rights-discourse, as described by Kennedy,
captures quite perfectly, I believe, the role that has been played by
rights discourse in the copyright domain.272 Our copyright system
had, at least from the mid-eighteenth century onwards, been built
upon a foundational perception of a “natural right” of authors—what
Kennedy might call “an existing outside right”—whose “existence”
does not appear to depend on legal enactment, but which has been
translated into positive law.273 In fact, as Martha Woodmansee has
argued, the recognition of this apparently pre-existing right was itself
“the product of the rise in the eighteenth century of a new group of
individuals: writers who sought to earn their livelihood from the sale
of their writings.”274
Over the course of the twentieth century, with the rise of a
formalist British judiciary committed to upholding private rights, the
abstract demands of the public interest became secondary or
peripheral to law’s task.275 Users of copyright protected works did
not constitute a cohesive group with shared needs and interests, but
rather were cognizable primarily as sole defendants before the courts,
individual wrong-doers and free-riders whose private actions invaded
the established rights of authors and copyright owners.276 What has
now happened in the twenty-first century—no doubt attributable in
large part to the rapid evolution of network technologies, combined
with the intrusion of copyright norms into the daily lives of average
citizens—is the rise of users as a group “having something in
common that is a positive rather than a negative identity[.]”277 Rather
than a diverse array of individualized infringers, users have emerged
272. Id. at 187-89.
273. Id. at 186-87. See supra Section II.A.
274. Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal
Conditions of the Emergence of the “Author”, 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUDIES
425, 426 (1984).
275. Id. at 438.
276. Id.
277. Kennedy, supra note 262, at 188.
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as a galvanized community with shared interests, demanding
recognition and protection.278 What naturally follows, as Kennedy
describes, is the turn to rights-talk as a “vehicle for formulating
interests and demands” in a way that will “fit” with the current legal
and political discourse.279
By employing the rhetoric of rights, the interests of users who
wish to deal freely and lawfully with protected works cannot be
reduced to mere personal preferences, nor can the demands of
would-be users be dismissed as self-serving preferences. If
established, user rights can assume the role of legal entities
(“factoids”) necessitating certain objectively correct conclusions
about what constitutes a lawful dealing.280 Users’ claims fit the
template of other copyright claims, readily understood and deserving
of equal recognition. Normative claims about what users should be
permitted to do freely, and the limits to which copyright claims ought
to be subject, metamorphose into a different kind of proposition
about the obligation of owners and law-makers to respect rights.281 In
these various ways, it is undoubtedly “meaningful” to speak of legal
rights with reference to fair dealing and other copyright exceptions.
Kennedy explains, in general terms: “The appeal to a rule cast in the
form of a right, or to a value understood to be represented by a right,
may produce the experience of closure: given this legalized right,
you can’t think of a good reason why the plaintiff shouldn’t lose the
case.”282
Similarly, we might reason, given the users’ right to deal fairly
with the work for the purposes of research or private study, there was
278. See Michael Geist, The Canadian Copyright Story: How Canada
Improbably Became the World Leader on Users’ Rights in Copyright Law, in
COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 169 (Ruth L.
Okediji ed. 2017); see, e.g., Michael Nelson, Battles over Digital Copyright (SOPA
and ACTA) and the Rise of “Exo-Politics”, EUROPEAN INSTITUTE: EUROPEAN
AFFAIRS (April 2012), https://www.europeaninstitute.org/index.php/147-europeanaffairs/ea-april-2012/1561-battles-over-digital-copyright-sopa-and-acta-and-therise-of-exo-politics (offering, by way of example, the successful mass political
protests launched against the U.S. Stop Online Piracy Act and against the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement).
279. Kennedy, supra note 262, at 188.
280. Id. at 188-89.
281. Id. at 194-95.
282. Id. at 195.
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no good reason in cases such as CCH, Bell, or Alberta for the
plaintiff copyright owner or collective not to lose the case.283
Recognition of the user’s right could foreclose the issue without the
need for further justification or debate. The point that we might take
from the CLS critique of rights, however, is that the assertion of a
user right is really no different in nature than the assertion of any
other normative argument based on politics, morality, or subjective
values about what ought to be—that is, arguments about what uses of
protected works ought to be permitted.284
If legal argument is open-textured and indeterminate, so too is the
legal process of defining what the user right actually “is.” Whether
photocopying law reports for lawyers, streaming 30 seconds of a
musical work, or distributing photocopied book chapters to students
“is” the exercise of a “user right” depends whether it is judged to be
fair dealing for a lawful purpose.285 The circularity of the logic
should be apparent: an activity is not fair dealing because it is a
user’s right; it is only said to be a user’s right if it is adjudged to be
fair dealing.286 The judicial decision to regard any particular activity
as fair dealing is no more or less objectively rational or correct just
because the legal question has been reframed as a question about
whether the activity is or is not a matter of right.
The indeterminacy of the user right means that the right is doing
less work than we might think: if the right does not determine the
outcome of a particular case, it merely translates the court’s
conclusion into rights-talk.287 The CLS “indeterminacy thesis” also
suggests that the power of the recognized right to truly act as a
bulwark against subsequent change is more limited than we might
hope or realize:288 the right is not, after all, a stable entity that can be
283. CCH Canadian v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 1 S.C.R. 339, paras. 8890 (Can.); Society of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada v. Bell
Canada, 2 S.C.R. 326, paras. 49-50 (Can.); Alberta v. Canadian Copyright
Licensing Agency, 2 S.C.R. 345, ¶¶ 37-38 (Can.).
284. CCH Canadian v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 1 S.C.R. 339, paras. 48
(Can.).
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Cf. ROBIN WEST, NORMATIVE JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTRODUCTION 126
(2011); Butler, supra note 264, at 2188 (discussing West’s description of the the
indeterminacy thesis by noting “the articulation of an interest as a ‘right’ by no
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reliably passed from one use or user to the next.289 While the
invocation of user rights might appear to substantively ground an
expansive interpretation of the fair dealing defense in one case, the
very same rhetorical lip-service to rights might accompany a narrow
interpretation in the next.290 Ultimately, rights-talk is just that. As
Mark Tushnet explains, “[t]o some extent the critique of rights serves
as a simple caution against overestimating the significance of legal
victories.”291
Courts’ reliance upon the metaphorical copyright “balance” to
reconcile conflicting rights-claims only emphasizes the point that
legal arguments about rights reduce down to policy arguments about
what ought to be.292 Balancing tests, Kennedy asserts, “render rights
argument indistinguishable from open-ended policy discourse[.]”293
The internal critique of rights, he explains,
reduces legal rights reasoning to policy reasoning by showing that it is
necessary to balance one side’s asserted right against the other side’s . . .
[W]hat determines the balance is not a chain of reasoning from a right or
even from two rights, but a third procedure, one that in fact involves
considering open-textured arguments from morality, social welfare,
expectations, and institutional competence and administrability.294

As we have seen, rights arguments have significant meaning and
effect in copyright law, and have traditionally been wielded to the
benefit of owners, whose claims to right have lent “closure” and a
sense of objective correctness to rulings in favor of the
owner/plaintiff claiming infringement.295 The claim of countervailing
user rights is no less meaningful, and may similarly bring closure and
objective correctness to rulings in the user/defendant’s favor. The
ostensibly depoliticizing and empowering nature of the claim to right
means creates an unmoveable bulwark against change, interference, or
recalibration of the protection of the various interests . . . toward which it so
desperately strives”).
289. Butler, supra note 264, at 2188.
290. See, e.g. United Airlines, Inc. v. Cooperstock, 2017 FC 616; Canadian
Copyright Licensing Agency v. York University, 2017 FC 669.
291. Mark Tushnet, The Critique of Rights, 47 SMU L. REV. 23, 25 (1994).
292. Kennedy, supra note 262, at 197.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 196.
295. Id. at 199.
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has much to offer users, and can be asserted as a means of
recalibrating the metaphorical balancing scales of copyright justice to
produce greater equilibrium.296 But the critique of rights outlined
here undermines the rational basis for regarding rights arguments as
essentially different from any other normative argument that might
be made in defense of the user. At the moment when we resort to
“balancing” a user’s right against a conflicting owner’s right, we
could just as well argue that the user’s activity ought to constitute
non-infringing fair dealing on general moral, political or utilitarian
grounds.297 The point becomes clearer when we insert the relevant
copyright claims into the following passage by Kennedy:
The upshot . . . is that the advocates confront the judge with two plausible
but contradictory chains of rights reasoning, one proceeding from the
plaintiff’s right [to exclusive control over the copyright work] and the
other from the defendant’s [right to use the work fairly]. Yes, the
[copyright owner has exclusive] rights, but the [user has user rights] . . .
Sometimes the judge more or less arbitrarily endorses one side over the
other; sometimes she throws in the towel and balances. The lesson . . . is
that the question involved cannot be resolved without resort to policy,
which in turn makes the resolution open to ideological influence . . .
[O]nce it is shown that the case requires a balancing of conflicting rights
claims, it is implausible that it is the rights themselves, rather than the
‘subjective’ or ‘political’ commitments of the judges, that are deciding the
outcome.298

The problem, according to Critical Legal Scholars, is not only that
rights are indeterminate, but also that they are potentially
“regressive.”299 “Winning” a right in a court case may not advance a
political goal, but worse, it might actually impede a political goal.300
296. Id. at 196-97.
297. Id.
298. Kennedy, supra note 262, at 198.
299. Butler, supra note 264, at 2189 (explaining that some theorists posit that
rights may hinder advancement “because rights are individual, rather than about
the welfare of groups”).
300. Cp. Butler, supra note 264, at 2189 (citing Tushnet, supra note 291, at 23
(explaining that “In its weakest version, the critique of rights argues that there is no
necessary connection between winning legal victories and advancing political
goals; in a somewhat stronger version it argues that, more frequently than most
lawyers think, winning legal victories either does not advance political goals or
actually impedes them. In the strongest and most implausible version the critique
of rights argues that winning legal victories almost never advances political
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In the copyright context, the concern is that the judicial embrace of
user rights will actually backfire to slow our progress towards a
fairer copyright regime.301 As Laura Murray has warned, within the
frame of a user right, what can constitute a relevant use suddenly
seems more terminal and finite and individual;302 the breadth of what
is fair constricts to what can be claimed within the scope of the
individual user’s right.303 As the battle between dueling rights-claims
takes hold, efforts will be made to constrict that right to its baseline
requirements. At the same time, the claim that users’ rights are duly
recognized within the copyright system will produce “a narrative of
legitimation,” a language for concluding that the system is fair,
objective and unbiased.304 (In reality, of course, copyright limitations
and exceptions as currently defined can do little to off-set the sheer
scope of copyright protection or to hold at bay the powerful forces
that demand it.)
If we are content to baldly assert users’ rights as shorthand to get
us where we want to go, we risk reducing larger normative claims
about the necessary limits of copyright protection down to bare
propositions about individual entitlements and duties.305 The reliance
on rights rhetoric therefore threatens to impoverish our discourse
around the public interest and the social values at stake in the
copyright context. The work of another prominent US critic of rights,
Mary Ann Glendon, is revealing in this regard. In a powerful attack
on America’s “shallow rights talk,”306 Glendon decries the resort to
“mere assertion over reason-giving,”307 arguing: “Our rights talk, in
its absoluteness, promotes unrealistic expectations, heightens social
conflict, and inhibits dialogue that might lead toward consensus,
goals.”).
301. Cf. Murray, supra note 245, at 351.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Cf. Butler, supra note 264, at 2189; Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990
DUKE L.J. 758, 775; see generally Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial
Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination law: A Critical Review of Supreme
Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978).
305. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 172 (1991).
306. Id.
307. Id. at 14 (explaining that the current rights talk creates an “inhospitable”
environment, and its narrow nature stops assistance to “the process of selfcorrecting learning”).
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accommodation, or at least the discovery of common ground.”308
Perhaps, in the absence of lurking rights claims, we might be freed
up to genuinely turn our minds to the question of how much
copyright protection is really necessary and justified in furtherance
of our shared social goals. Instead, we clamor to have our rights
recognized by and protected against one another.309 While the stated
objectives of our copyright system require a teleological lens, claims
to right focus on origins and present-day entitlements.310 In terms that
ring true in today’s copyright climate, Glendon warns against the
“present-mindedness”311 of rights talk as an obstacle to genuine
communication and public deliberation.
Also resonant in the copyright context is Glendon’s critique of
rights talk as missing a “dimension of sociality.”312 Remarking on the
“relentless individuality” of our rights rhetoric, she warns that “our
stark rights vocabulary receives subtle amplification from its
encoded image of the lone rights-bearer[.]”313 If rights talk is
inhospitable to the social dimension of personhood, relationships and
communities, then it is inhospitable to the very considerations that
ought to inform our copyright law; authorship, after all, is a
communicative act with an inherently inter-personal dimension.314
Both the purposes and the limits of copyright protection can be
appreciated only with a view to the social value of creativity and
culture, and the importance of a vibrant public domain.315
In sum, Glendon’s contends, “[o]ur rights-laden discourse . . .
easily accommodates the economic, the immediate, and the personal
308. Id.
309. Sun, supra note 139, at 164-65.
310. Alina N. Boyte, Finding Copyright’s Core Content, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J.
774, 774 (2012).
311. GLENDON, supra note 305, at 182.
312. Id. at 109.
313. Id. at 109, 143 (“Our overblown rights rhetoric and our vision of the rightsbearer as an autonomous individual channel our thoughts away from what we have
in common and focus them on what separates us. They draw us away from
participation in public life and point us toward the maximization of private
satisfactions.”).
314. Carys J. Craig, Symposium: Reconstructing the Author-Self: Some Feminist
Lessons for Copyright Law, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 207, 219
(2007) [hereinafter Craig, Symposium].
315. See generally CRAIG, COPYRIGHT, COMMUNICATION & CULTURE, supra
note 37.
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dimensions of a problem, while it regularly neglects the moral, the
long-term, and the social implications.”316 If this is indeed to be the
nature of our rights-laden copyright discourse, we will neglect the
very considerations that ought to be informing the development of
our copyright system.
Even if we accept these critiques of rights as sound and pertinent,
however, we may find it hard to shake the sense that the rhetoric of
user rights is both necessary and desirable if we are to effectively
restrain copyright and augment the scope for free and lawful use of
protected works.317 The assertion of rights, as Glendon reminds us, is
usually a sign of a breakdown in a relationship;318 and so it may be in
the copyright context, where the needs, capacities and desires of
users have been subordinated for so long to the demands and dictates
of owners. We might argue, then, that our situation demands
recourse—or indeed resort—to user rights. The determination of
whose right prevails in the so-called copyright balance may well be
subject to the whims or political commitments of the judges, but why
not play the game? There is, in copyright, as in other areas, a good
politically pragmatic argument for critiquing the critique of rights—
not because it is wrong, perhaps, but because it is unhelpful or even
harmful to the cause.319 It is to this “critique of the critique” that we
now briefly turn.

B. RESORTING TO RIGHTS: POLITICAL PRAGMATISM
The argument at the heart of the “critique of the critique” of rights
is that the choice of target is, strategically, a poor one—and,
politically, a dangerous one.320 Why pull the rug out from under the
feet of rights that can be leveraged to advance your political goals?
316. GLENDON, supra note 305, at 171; see also LAURA J. MURRAY ET AL.,
PUTTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN ITS PLACE: RIGHTS DISCOURSE, CREATIVE
LABOR, AND THE EVERYDAY 14-15 (2014) (commenting, aptly, “we think the same
could be said of popular Intellectual Property Rights discourses”).
317. Craig, Symposium, supra note 314, at 267-68.
318. GLENDON, supra note 305, at 175.
319. Stan J. Liebowitz, A Critique of Copyright Criticisms, 22 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 943, 958 (2007).
320. Craig, Putting the Community in Communication, supra note 69, at 114
(arguing that the Michelin approach to “copyright and freedom of expression” is
unhelpful to human rights and “social goals,” ultimately delegitimizing the
copyright system).
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Should we not choose our targets in a way that avoids disarming,
demoralizing, or further disempowering those who share our values
and ideological goals? So what if the power of rights is purely
rhetorical? Why would we not deliberately harness and strategically
deploy that power for all it’s worth?
Thus, feminist and critical race theorists (CRT) largely resisted the
CLS critique of rights, decrying the deconstruction of rights by the
predominantly white, male Critical Legal Scholars even while
sympathizing with their fundamental rights-skepticism.321 While few
feminists or critical race theorists are blind to the conceptual failings
of liberal legal reasoning or the shifting and political nature of
‘rights’ as such, most are unwilling to give them up, and usually for
good reason.322 As Kennedy acknowledges, “the notion is that rights
rhetoric is or at least once was effective, and we would be giving that
up by losing faith in rights.”323 Or perhaps worse, “if ‘we’ lose our
faith in rights rhetoric but ‘they’ don’t, then they will gain an
advantage over us. . . . ‘Giving up’ rights would be like a
professional athlete giving up steroids when all her competitors were
still wedded to them.”324 In the copyright context, to back away from
user rights while leaving the author’s claim to right intact would only
perpetuate existing inequalities within the copyright system and
further obstruct the attainment of its public purposes.325
Whereas CLS (and its postmodernist offshoots) sought to
disaggregate the concept of ‘right,’ many feminist and CRT scholars
contended that this move overlooked the historical potential of rights
in the real lives and lived experiences of women and racialized
minorities.326 Feminist scholar Martha Minow defended the use of
321. Mark Tushnet, The Critique of Rights, 47 SMU L. REV. 23, 25 (1994)
(noting that CLS scholars were not deaf to these critiques: “Does not the critique of
rights implicitly, and to some extent explicitly, deprive progressives of a tool—
rights arguments that has proved useful? Does not it implicitly, and to some extent
explicitly, criticize advocates for pursuing what seemed to them the only
reasonable course available under circumstances of severe inequality?”).
322. Craig, Symposium, supra note 314, at 239.
323. Kennedy, supra note 262, at 216-17.
324. Id. at 217.
325. Sun, supra note 17, at 146-47.
326. GLENDON, supra note 305 (stressing that feminist scholars have also
mounted powerful critiques of liberal rights-talk, often objecting less to the
fictional and obfuscatory quality of rights claims and more to the fundamental
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rights while largely accepting the CLS critique:
Rights discourse, like any language, may mislead, seduce, falsely
console, or wrongly inflame. . . . Yet, I wonder sometimes who I am
helping and who I am hurting by criticizing rights. It turns out to be
helpful, useful, and maybe even essential to be able to couch a
request as a claim of rights. . . .There is something too valuable in the
aspiration of rights . . . to abandon the rhetoric of rights.327
Kimberlée Crenshaw, a leading voice in the critical race
scholarship, also wrote about the gains that have been made through
the invocation of rights, even while acknowledging their risks and
limits:
Rights have been important. They may have legitimated racial
inequality, but they have also been the means by which oppressed
groups have secured entry as formal equals into the dominant
order . . . .Challenges and demands made from outside the
institutional logic would have accomplished little[.]328
Perhaps the most powerful example, however, of this uneasy but
essential compromise is found in Patricia Williams’ work, in which
she explores her personal discomfort with the CLS critique in spite
of the “many good reasons for abandoning a system of rights which
are premised on inequality and helplessness[.]”329 She explains why
many black scholars remain committed to the pursuit of rights, “even
if what CLS scholars say about rights—that they are contradictory,
indeterminate, reified and marginally decisive in social behavior—is
so.”330 Without idealizing the importance of rights, and recognizing
that they are “often selectively invoked to draw boundaries, to
isolate, and to limit,”331 Williams insisted that “the subtlety of rights’
real instability . . . does not render unusable their persona of

individualizing and antagonistic nature of rights-rhetoric as well as the absence of
any sufficient recognition of countervailing responsibilities and obligations).
327. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION,
AND AMERICAN LAW 306-07 (1990).
328. KIMBERLÉ CRENSHAW, Race, Reform and Retrenchment in CRITICAL RACE
THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT INFORMED THE MOVEMENT 118-119 (1995).
329. Patricia Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from
Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 404 (1987).
330. Id.
331. Id. at 405.
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stability.”332 Rather, the “vocabulary of rights” speaks to the
establishment that holds the keys to social change—change that can
be argued for “in the sheep’s clothing” of rights.333
While CLS seek to unmask rights mythology to reveal its
powerlessness, the CRT perspective invites the historically excluded
and disempowered to “don the mask” and put its magical power to
good ends.334 Williams evocatively celebrated the “immense
alchemical fire” it took for blacks to kindle rights into something
real, to give them “life where there was none before.”335 She insists
that there is, in this sense, the possibility of a “dual consciousness”
with which the historically disadvantaged can see and leverage the
political potential of rights while still perceiving their lack of
objective foundation and analytic determinacy.336
Reflecting on William’s approach, Angela Harris proposes that
there is strength to be gained from embracing this dilemma.337 The
task is to “live in the tension itself.”338 For Harris, this suggests two
aspirations for a “jurisprudence of reconstruction”:339 sophistication
about the legal subject (the situated, intersectional self);340 and
disenchantment around the romantic faith in modernism and liberal
rights.341 Rather than a romantic belief in equality and rights, the
focus shifts to the process of empowerment and struggle, and the
continual task of reconstruction.342
332. Id.
333. Id. at 410.
334. See id. at 430-31.
335. Id. at 404 (“To say that blacks never really believed in rights is true; yet it
is also true that blacks believed in them so much and so hard that we gave them
life . . . we held onto them, put the hope of them into our wombs, mothered them
and not the notion of them . . . this was not the dry process of reification . . . but its
opposite . . . resurrection.”).
336. Id.
337. Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82
CALIF. L. REV. 741, 743 (1994).
338. Id. at 744.
339. Id. (arguing that “jurisprudence of reconstruction” refers to the task of
“continually rebuil[ding] modernism in light of the modernist critique” and
referring to “living in ‘dissensus’” as “a commitment to modernism and a
willingness to criticize, even reject, its basic assumptions”)
340. Id. at 767-78 (presenting a more nuanced and expansive explanation of
what is meant by “sophistication”).
341. See id. at 778-84.
342. Id.
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There are, of course, crucial differences in nature and scope
between constitutional rights asserted by women and racialized
people in the demand for equality and dignity, and the copyright and
user rights claims under discussion here.343 The right to be free from
state-sanctioned violence, for example, is not in the same realm as
the right to be free to copy.344 It is worth emphasizing, however, that
racial and gender inequalities permeate copyright law as they do any
other area of our law and society. The availability of copyright
protection and fair use can have significant and disproportionately
harmful effects for creators and users “from the margins,” silencing
critique, undermining the value of creative contributions, and
ultimately denying equal participation in our cultural dialogue.345
343. Williams, supra note 329, at 401-05 (noting that there exists a discourse
boundary, drawn by different lived experiences, that changes the relationship one
has to the idea of rights; not meaning to imply an equal or comparable sense of
disempowerment on behalf of those who belong in the shifting category of users of
copyright protected works).
344. For an excellent discussion of liberal rights and racialized experiences of
policing in America, see Ekow Yankah, The Failure of Rights in Racial Justice 14
JERUSALEM
REV.
LEGAL
STUD.
192,
193,
200
(2016),
https://doi.org/10.1093/jrls/jlw012 (arguing that “only a philosophical shift from
focusing on individual rights . . . gives hope in addressing questions of racial
equality” and confronting head on the political challenge posed by the rights
critique by saying, “I realize my criticism of contemporary liberalism’s rightsfocused myopia may be unconvincing to some, even raising hackles, . . . given the
breadth of theories that travel under the name liberalism . . . [but] the focus on
individual rights obscures racialized criminal law and policing).”
345. See e.g., Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical
Borrowing, Copyright and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547 (2006); K.J.
Greene, “Copynorms,” Black Cultural Production, and the Debate over AfricanAmerican Reparations, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1179 (2008); K.J. Greene,
Copyright, Culture & Black Music: A Legacy of Unequal Protection, 21 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 339, 358-59 (1999); K.J. Greene, Intellectual Property at the
Intersection of Race and Gender: Lady Sings the Blues, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 365 (2008) [hereinafter Greene, Intellectual Property]; see also
BOATEMA BOATNEG, THE COPYRIGHT THING DOESN’T WORK HERE: ADINKRA
AND KENTE CLOTH AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN GHANA (2011); Ann Bartow,
Fair Use and the Fairer Sex: Gender, Feminism, and Copyright Law, 14 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 551, 552, 559-64 (2006); Malla Pollak, Towards a
Feminist Theory of the Public Domain, or Rejecting the Gendered Scope of United
States Copyrightable and Patentable Subject Matter, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN
& L. 603 (2006); see generally IRENE CALBOLI & SRIVIDHYA RAGAVAN EDS.,
DIVERSITY IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: IDENTITIES, INTERESTS, AND
INTERSECTIONS (2015); John Tehranian, Towards a Critical IP Theory: Copyright,
Consecration, and Control, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1233.
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There are, then, real and not only rhetorical connections between the
assertion of users’ rights in copyright contexts—the freedom to
challenge meanings, upset symbols, transform works, to speak and to
be heard—and the persistent realities of inequality to which our
copyright system contributes (in particular, through the subordination
of some voices for the valorization, amplification and economic
benefit of others).346
As we tackle the question of user rights, then, it should come as no
surprise that there are helpful lessons to be drawn from the feminist
and critical race scholars’ stance on rights.347 Feminist and CRT
critique of CLS’s attack on rights-based reasoning opens up political
and conceptual space for a kind of “dual consciousness” on the part
of advocates of users’ rights in the copyright context.348 The
proposition would be that users and the public—whose needs and
interests have been marginalized in the face of owners’ individual
rights claims—may perceive the inherent flaws of rights-based
reasoning in the copyright system while nonetheless seeking to
identify and enforce countervailing rights. User communities can
don the mask or the sheep’s clothing of rights to issue a rhetorical
rallying cry, mobilizing the public and demanding mutual
recognition within the copyright system.349
Perhaps it is a similar combination of sophistication and
disenchantment to which we should aspire in the copyright context.
The reconstruction of copyright for the digital age requires
sophistication about the nature of the author/user, and the
intersectionality350 of our own selfhood: in different contexts,
moments in time and relationships, we are all authors, users, creators,
borrowers, producers, consumers, citizens, private individuals and
members of the public. It also demands disenchantment; we should
set aside our romantic vision of authorship and originality, as well as
346. Greene, Intellectual Property, supra note 345, at 366.
347. Id. at 385 (describing how black women artists have “been impacted by the
IP system” comparably to indigenous peoples and how IP has been “central to
racial subordination,” offering helpful insights to “guide reforms to the IP
system”).
348. Williams, supra note 329, at 414.
349. Id. at 431-32.
350. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and
Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory
and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 166-67.
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our faith in modernist ideals of radical
individuality and
351
transcendent rights. Strength can be drawn from embracing the
tension inherent in the simultaneous commitment to, and skepticism
of, a rights-based copyright system. The focus can shift to the
process of empowering users and reconstructing copyright in service
of the public interest.
The question to be answered is ultimately a strategic one that takes
into account the way that rights are experienced in this context: Will
the “enervating effect of rights talk”352 advance the interests and meet
the needs of users and the public, or will it do more harm than good?
While the dominant ideology of copyright law remains one of
possessive individualism and modernist enlightenment values, it may
make sense to harness its logic to protect downstream authors and
users.353 If the “vocabulary of rights” speaks to the establishment,
then it seems wise to use it.354 We should, however, heed Glendon’s
plea to tone down the “American rights dialect” and “refine our
rhetoric.”355 The real task will be to ensure that the rights discourse
employed in the name of the public interest is capable of
communicating concepts of responsibility, sociality and futurelooking teleology, for these are vital to understanding both why we
have copyright and why copyright has limits. It may still be possible
for us to reclaim and reimagine rights in the copyright realm in a way
that fundamentally reshapes the system for the benefit of us all.356
351. Harris, supra note 337, at 778.
352. Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have
What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301, 305 (1987).
353. Greene, Intellectual Property, supra note 345, at 385.
354. Boyte, supra note 320, at 774-75.
355. See GLENDON, supra note 305, at 171.
356. Carys J. Craig, Technological Neutrality: Recalibrating Copyright in the
Information Age, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 601, 625-31 (2016) (sketching out
a “relational rights” approach that would ask how different available versions of
the copyright interest could structure the relationships between affected parties
differently to better foster the social values at stake, such as supporting creativity
and dissemination, furthering progress of the arts, protecting free expression, and
promoting a vibrant public domain); see also JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW’S
RELATIONS: A RELATIONAL THEORY OF SELF, AUTONOMY, AND LAW 235 (2011)
(explaining the meaning of and motivation for a “relational” approach to legal
rights in general); Sun, supra note 17, at 145-47 (advancing a compelling argument
that fair use should be recognized not as an individual right but as a “collective
right held by the public”).

2017]

GLOBALIZING USER RIGHTS-TALK

71

V. CONCLUSION
To be skeptical about the language of user rights is not to be
against user rights within the copyright system. Whether or not to
invoke the rhetoric of user rights is not a question about whether
libraries should be permitted to make copies for patrons, or teachers
for their students, and so on. (They should.) Nor is it to query
whether flexible fair use provisions should replace fair dealing, or
international treaties should require parties to enact adequate
exceptions. (They should.) It is, rather, a question about the discourse
through which we want to conduct the argument about the
appropriate limits of copyright.
There is scope, certainly, for the assertion of user rights as a way
to formulate demands for a fair use defense, for example, while
“being conscious of the critique of the whole enterprise, sensing the
shiftiness of the sand beneath one’s feet.”357 But there is also a risk to
shoring up the enterprise—in this case, the rights-based copyright
model—at precisely the spot where we know the ground is unstable
for the users and public interest advocates trying to take a stand.
The danger, I have suggested, is that we firmly tie our position—
on the need for a strong public domain, the importance of the public
interest, the centrality of fair use and the importance of recognizing
copyright’s limits—to the vindication of individual rights as the
defining logic of copyright law.358 Rather than defusing the authors’
rights claim as obfuscatory legal fiction that masks political interests,
we simply “see” that right and “raise” our own on behalf of the user.
For those of us who have argued against the use of rights-based
reasoning to advance the cause of an ever-expanding copyright
monopoly, there is surely “something ‘weakening’ or ‘undermining’”
about the fact that we are using exactly the rhetoric we had sought to
discredit.359 And for those of us committed to the notion that
copyright is simply a regulatory tool to achieve a desired social end
(the encouragement of learning or creativity, or the progress of the
arts), it is surely a step backwards to endorse a “balance” between
owners’ and users’ “rights.”360
357.
358.
359.
360.

Kennedy, supra note 262, at 190.
Craig, Putting the Community in Communication, supra note 69, at 114.
Kennedy, supra note 262, at 204-05.
Sun, supra note 17, at 152.

72

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[33:1

By tying up public interest objectives in the discourse of rights and
counter-rights, balances and trumps, we risk losing sight of—even
losing the ability to credibly articulate—objections to copyright’s
over-reach in terms that are community-oriented, functional and
value-driven. Rather than appealing to the need to encourage cultural
creativity, advance participatory democracy and development goals,
enhance education and enjoyment of the arts, we risk reducing these
overarching political and social objectives to the clashing of
individual rights.361 Rather than asking what laws in a particular
country, or what outcome in a particular case, would best align with
and advance the public purposes of our copyright system, we might
limit ourselves to asking whose individual right should prevail.
There is no doubt, however, that in the context of an international
copyright regime dominated by corporate concerns over the
protection of intellectual property rights, “the very idea that users of
copyright works should have ‘rights’ is decidedly empowering.”362
User rights may still be the most effective tool at our disposal to
advance the interests of users of protected works and the public in
general in the face of the powerful rights-based claims of authors and
corporate owners. After all, “user rights” seem to have conquered
more ground for the public domain in Canada, at least, than abstract
ideas about the public interest or warnings about the dangers of overprotection ever have before.363 Acknowledging that disputes about
the scope of control over intellectual works typically and
increasingly find their articulation in claims of rights (whether to
property or free speech, copyright or users’ rights), perhaps our
energies are better spent debating “not whether but how the language
of rights will be used.”364 Ultimately, as Jennifer Nedelsky asserts,
361. Cf. Sun, supra note 17, at 144-45 (arguing with respect to US courts’
interpretation of fair use that “the individual right-based approach . . . has caused
direct and indirect harms to public interests in free speech, democratic
participation, and cultural development”).
362. Tawfik, International Copyright Law and ‘Fair Dealing’, supra note 189,
at 7.
363. But see Tushnet, supra note 291 and Kennedy, supra note 292 (describing
recent case law in Canada’s lower courts that has shown, consistent with Tushnet’s
caution, that the ongoing significance of such legal victories ought not to be overemphasized. The political fight for a fair copyright law that leaves room for
expressive and educational uses of protected works is ongoing.).
364. Cf. NEDELSKY, supra note 356, at 235.
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rights are just “a particular institutional and rhetorical means of
expressing, contesting, and implementing . . . values.”365 In efforts to
globalize fair use or to safeguard and strengthen L&Es in our
international copyright system, we should employ whatever
rhetorical means will best communicate, to the relevant audience, the
social values at stake when copyright overreaches.
My hope is that the turn towards user rights-talk will prove to be
effective in articulating and advancing a fairer copyright regime
around the globe. But there remains cause for caution: to simply rely
on the abstract assertion of user rights as the vehicle to drive the
public interest and to restrain copyright’s reach could be to sacrifice
a “functional approach” for “transcendental nonsense”366—perhaps
advancing immediate political aims, but potentially undermining
larger social goals by reducing them to yet another individual rightsclaim clumsily thrown onto copyright’s (illusory) balancing scales.

365. Id. at 241.
366. Cf. Cohen, supra note 256, at 847-49.

